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VOL. XVI. MARCH, 1918 No. 5 .. 
GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. 
"We shall not light up our temple from that unhallowed fire. It 
will be illuminated with other lights. It will be perfumed with o'ther 
incense than the infectious stuff which is imported by the smugglers 
of adulterated metaphysics."-Burke. 
A NNEXED as an appendix to the translation of Kohler's Phil-osophy of Law is an appreciation of the work bv Adolf Las-
son,1 who complains that he himself once wrote a philosophy 
of law which has sunk into oblivion, probably for the reason, as he 
modestly suggests, that he knew so much of systematic philosophy 
that he had no time to acquire any "special scientific learning either 
1 A professor at the University of :Berlin, who published in 1882 a "System der 
Rechtsphilosophie" w)lich is the work to which he refers as characterized by little knowl-
edge of law. His ideas are a strange farrago of contradications. The law, he says, is 
an ordering to govern men's conduct toward other men and its form, more or less acci-
dental, has been given it by history. Here he fo!lo\VS Savigny. He next announces that 
all law is positive law, supposing thereby that he throws aside natural law. Law can 
exist only as the product of the authority of the state. Here he follows Austin and 
Hobbes. Justice is an absolute principle which has its source in equality. Here he fol-
lows both Kant and Hegel who borrowed from Rousseau. Justice, hbwever, is an ideal 
which the law ought to follow but which it can never realize. Here he is on the ground 
of natural law, but his assumption that justice is any more definite than law is wholly 
gratuitous and commonplace. Law next becomes a portion of ethics, which, of course, 
it is not. He maintains that the problem of philosophy of law is to interpret existing 
law as an expression of reason. Law lives and finds its source in human consciousness. 
The principles of law are justice and liberty and it is an harmonious expression of the 
relation between the inner life and needs of the community and the outer forms of 
the regulation of that life. The rule in Shelley's Case touches the inner life very closely. 
He defines the state as a human association, which it no doubt is, but suddenly he finds 
that to this artificial human association "belong the people, the land, the sovereignty". 
The human creation, therefore, is higher than its creator, and lie says that the origin 
of the state is remote from the people's wi!L Here he is thinking of the divine right 
of the worthy Hohenzollern llurgrave of Nuremberg, who bought the old Mark of 
:Brandenburg from the Emperor and thus made "the sovereignty of the people a mean-
ingless term". At last like all the rest he reaches Prussian absolutism. This nonsensical 
compound is to Professor Kocourek an important systematic contribution to legal phil-
osophy. Lassan, of course, is at one with the eminent jurist, von Tirpitz, in denying 
that international law has any legal status, i. e., Prussian recognition. 
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in the law or any other special department of knowledge."2 This 
complaint is a confession, child-like and amusing in its vanity, which 
could be dismissed without comment, were it not something that 
is wholly German, very German of very German, I hope I m~· 
say without irreverence; for German legal philosophers are plainly 
separable into two classes, the very large class to which Lasson 
admits that he belongs, who know nothing of law, and the very 
small class, who know something of law but are not philosophers. 
It is not an accident that these wise men who "profess" law as their 
special province call_ themselves mainly either Neo-Hegelians or 
Neo-Kantians. Neither Kant nor Hegel was a faint skiagraph of a 
jurist, yet both essayed a philosophy of law,3 based upon a much 
wider system of metaphysics. And it is generally true that the Ger-
man philosophy of law is a mere side issue of a pretentious trans-
cendental theory of the Prussian state. 
In an earlier work4 Herr Professor Lasson with true Teutonic 
truculent arrogance avows that teaching as to the meaning and pur-
pose of the state which is a household word in Germany: "The na-
tional state, representing the highest expression of the culture of its 
race can come into being only by means of the destruction of other 
states and this destruction can be effected only by violence." This 
is the orthodox Kultur creed of greed and aggression which has 
brought on the great war. There will never be wanting in Germany 
philosophers to give a governmental dogma an apparently philosophic 
expression and this particular dogma is the crown of their legal 
philosophy. One looks at Lasson's atrocious statement-atrocious 
for this age-and is wholly unable to realize the morally filthy soul 
that is capable of prattling in the next breath of right and morality, 
•Appendix II, Kohler's Philosophy of Law, translated by Albrecht, p. 331. In the 
introduction to this work are some observations by Professor Kocourek, which are re· 
ferred to in the preceding note. 
• Hegel and Kant each thought that right was the fundamental idea and hence their 
philosophy of law is really a philosophy of right, which is a very different thing from a 
philosophy of law and is a task which may be attempted by a metaphysician with impunity. 
It has been said that Recht here ought to be translated law (see Kocourek's note 1, 
Gareis, Science of Law, p. 1), but this is a total error. When these writers mean law, 
they use the word Rechts. The use of Recht for law belongs to a much later time. A 
mere cursory reading of Puchta or Kant or Hegel will show the utter confusion that 
would result. Right is to them the reality, law is a mere development of right, so far 
as it can be called law. The transcendental state theory is caused by their attempt to 
make the actual government the highest expression of right. 
•Das Kulturidea/ und der Krieg, p. 66. Treitschke in his Politics i, 65, 66, sets forth 
the same creed with even more rawness. Treitschke, by the way, thinks President Jack· 
son was "the conqueror of Texas" and asserts that "the reverence of the masses for 
President Lincoln rose to such a pitch that he could perfectly well have attained to kingly 
power among them had he so willed it" (Politics ii, 285). Compared with him the 
muddle-headed von Holst is a master of history. 
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liberty~and equality. It comes as a sort of shock to find that this 
same Lasson, echoing both Kant and Hegel, pretends to believe the 
function of government to be "the development of law toward jus-
tice, which offers the ideals of freedom and equality as the goal of 
such development".5 This freedom and equality is best realized ac-
cording to German philosophers under the autocratic military Prus-
sian state and they seem to believe that they prove that the citizen 
enjoys freedom and equality by being denied both and that the state 
realizes justice by enslaving and destroying its weaker neighbors.6 
We naturally inquire of these worthy idealists how they are able to 
differentiate such a state in spirit and design from Morgan's band 
of pirates. They as a social organization under an autocratic ruler, 
who made women "walk the plank", realized freedom and equality 
in the same way with a military organization and they had a form 
of Kultur which could achieve itself only by force and violence and 
yet a world of unthinking realists rejoiced when they were all killed 
or hanged. Is it not for much the same reason that the whole civil-
ized world receives as tidings of joy the reports of great German 
losses in dead and wounded, tempered with regret that the wounded 
were merely wounded? 
The Herr Professor Doctor Lasson reminds us of Frederick the 
Great's cynical avowal that he committed his lawless acts of ag-
gression first and then set some professor to work to justify them. 
It may well be asked what is the advantage of examining such a -
philosophy of law if its outcome is a palpably indefensible result. 
The most important reason is that upon a proper philosophy of law 
resulting in a proper theory of the state depends the question 
whether there is or can be an international law, the most important 
legal question for our day and the future. Another reason is that 
in these last years we have been hearing much of the surpassing 
importance of German legal philosophy. Lately a number of trans-
• Berolzheimer in his Legal Philosophies, translated by Mrs. Jastrow, p. 285, sup· 
presses all reference to the earlier book of Lassan. He shows a similar reticence as to 
Nietzsche and Treitschke. ' This is only another instance of the hypocritical attempts at 
deception so prominent a feature of 1\liinsterberg. The latter never had the hardihood 
in this country to admit the Prussian theory of the state, but he was trying to lead 
up to it, as will later be shown. 
•By a curious inversion of language, this lawless, swash·buckling, buccaneering state 
is in their absurd language an lntel/igenzstaat, a Kulturstaat. But this state is on no 
higher moral plane than when Caesar noted (De Bello Galico, ,.i, 23) that the Germans 
of one tribe thought stealing from another tribe highly meritorious rather than blame· 
worthy. Velleius Paterculus (ii, 19) notes them as natumquc 111c11dacio genus, "a race born 
for lying". "The monsters that barbarous Germany breeds" (Germania quos liorrida 
parturit fetus, Horace, Odes iv, 5, 26) have not changed in moral attributes in two thou· 
sand years. 
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lations of German legal works has been put forth by the associated 
law schools. In reading some pro-German introductions and pre-
faces to these books we are made to feel that we have been losing 
"the precious life blood of master spirits". The hierophants of th;, 
propaganda have been attempting to commit the law schools of our 
country to a serious and exhaustive study of these works to the 
exclusion of more useful things. The rub-a-dub of this phase of 
the pro-German propaganda is but a part of the general pro-German 
drum beating that has found. places for such persons as Miinster-
berg, Francke and Dernburg.7 It will not do for us to act as the 
indignant householder who, when he had thoroughly digested the 
German sacking of Belgium and northern France, went to his china 
closet apd meticulously smashed all his Dresden and Meissen. Even 
though most of it be hideous, it is worth while to look into this 
enormous output of the professorial Pandours8 and see whether this 
"country of damned professors", as Lord Palmerston called it,9 
has achieved anything of note in its attempt to construct a philosophy 
of the science of law, which is easily the most uncertain of all the 
sciences connected with that most uncertain of all things, human 
nature expressing itself in social existence. 
These Germans for a century have been abusing each other, 
wrangling through innumerable Enzyklopadien, Grundlinien, Grund-
begriffe, Grundrisse, Grundlagen, Grundziige, Grundlegungen, 
Grundlehren, and other profundities of that sort and through 
periodicals and articles in various kinds of Zeitschriften about what 
law is and the true philosophy thereof and the place of law in the 
Teutonic universe. As a matter of fact the quarrel is over mere 
words, theories and definitions, but not over actualities. To under-
stand their various schools and conclusions we must survey those 
•I suppose we may acquit the persons, who have been misled, of any consciousness 
that they were being used as tools of the propaganda, but I hardly know what to say of 
Dean Hall of the Law School of the University of Chicago, who was not ashamed to 
enter on a warm defence of German submarine methods against merchant vessels. He 
doubtless has now seen the error of his ways. 
s I hope no one will understand that for the greater number of professors in this 
country I have any feeling, but one of warm admiration. Many of them have given 
themselves wholly pro patria. Their course is an honor to humanity. The great ma-
jority of professors of law in this country have no use for the German legal philosophy. 
• We now reflect that Lord Palmerston was the only English statesman of the long 
reign of Victoria who understood the Pru~sian aims. He desired to fight in 1864 for 
Denmark and the Duchies, but he was overruled by the Queen. Until the letters of Lord 
Clarendon, Lord Granville and, best of all, Sir Robert Morier were published, it was not 
known how often the Queen mounted what Lord Granville called "her German high 
horse" to England's detriment. The lowest period of England's foreign policy was when 
Gortchakoff said to the English ambassador: "I understand, then, that England will not 
go to war on a point of honor.'' 
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general considerations which enter into legal philosophy in order to 
estimate the German treatment of the material and to comprehend 
their riotous discussion. That any branch of knowledge should 
have -a philosophy, it must first become a science. Science is based 
upon matters of fact. What law is must first be settled as a matter 
of fact. From matters of fact a theory or philosophy generalizing 
the facts of the science may possibly be constructed if they can be 
ascertained with completeness after a survey from different points 
of view. To this end, law first may be examined from the stand-
point of the larger facts that condition, limit and restrict it. Sec-
ond, it may be investigated in regard to its place· and sphere among 
the other sciences concerned with human conduct. Third, it may 
be considered from the standpoint of the portion of human conduct 
to which it is confined. Fourth, it may be surveyed in its growth 
as shown in history and by comparative jurisprudence. Lastly, its 
rules must be analyzed from the standpoint of what they actually 
are, what the philosophers in their metaphorical jargon call its "con-
tent". Then a glance at the so-called schools gives some further 
light upon the subject. The common method of approaching the 
subject is by a ponderous notebook apparatus quoting voluminously 
from various authors and creating a hodge-podge of illy digested 
matter in the German way. If one attempts to say anything upon 
this subject he ought to have in mind Seneca's advice, "It is dis-
graceful for a mature man or one approaching maturity to get his 
wisdom out of his notebook. 'Zeno said this' : 'Yes, but what do you 
say?' 'Cleanthes said this', 'But what have you -to say?' How long 
are you going to march under another's banner? Put out some-
thing of your own. I have a very poor opinion of those who are 
never trying to create, but always to interpret, always lurking in 
the shadow of some one else".10 Besides, one who has spent all his 
days in busy practice could not follow the common-place book gen-
iuses even if he had the time to copy bulky extracts. 
I. 
FUNDAMENTAL FACTS. 
The fundamental fact disputed by no one is that law is concerned 
with human conduct. The obvious limitation upon human acts in-
stinctively recognized by all human beings, whatever their grade of 
intelligence, is that the lives of themselves and their offspring• must 
be preserved. As in the case of all animals, the preservation of the 
""°Seneca, Moral Epistles: 33, 7. 
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species is bound up with the preservation of individuals. Since 
human offspring require years of nurture to become viable, the pres-
ervation of the species presupposes the extended support and bring-
ing up of the young. This ultimate fact was recognized by the gre~; 
Roman jurist Ulpian in his famous passage (so much misunder-
stood) as to a natural law which we enjoy in common with other 
animals. He speaks in this connection "of the union of male and 
female, procreation of children and bringing up of the young".11 
This statement has been denounced by Austin in his raw, Jacobinical, 
Benthamic way12 as "a foolish conceit" and "an inept speculation", 
but Austin simply does not understand. Ulpian means that the 
most fundamental natural fact13 about the subject-matter of law, as 
regulati_ng human actions, is to recognize that human beings are 
animals, that the elemental facts which govern and preserve animal 
life must govern them; that the race must be preserved in the same 
general way that every animal species is preserved and that the 
preservation of the race presupposes unions of men and women, 
and the begetting and the rearing of children. It is not likely that 
any race, however low, ever consciously violated this absolute re-
quirement. We know, as a matter of reason, what is the fact, that 
the most fundamental part of law will be concerned with the family, 
marriage, the domestic relations including parent and child, as well 
as with the protection of human life and human security and the 
assuring to the family what happens to be necessary as properly, 
with suitable provisions to secure the family property to the suc-
cession of the children. Whatever may be the variations among 
different peoples, this is found to be a part of every system and 
it may be called natural law. 
The second fundamental fact is that it is impossible to consider 
human beings except in association with other human beings. I do 
not mean the family group alone, which is predicated upon an un-
alterable fact of nature, but it is impossible to consider law as ap-
plicable to even a single family group at any stage of human his-
tory. None of the legal theories which build upon the family as the 
original unit is verifiable. Human beings even in the lowest phase 
of savagery lived and always have continued to live in some sort 
of social aggregate larger than the family. This is a settled fact in 
biological and anthropological science ; "man can live only in society 
11 Maris atque feminae co11junctio, liberorum procreatio, educatio. 
12 Austin Jurisp. (5th Ed.), 209, 210, 552. 
""The natural law (jus naturale) of Gaius's Institutes is a different thing from what 
is meant by Ulpian in the passage above. In other places Ulpian himself uses natural law 
in the ordinary sense of Roman jurisprudence, which is the product of reason. 
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and has never lived except in society."14 There is nothing new in 
this conception. Aristotle's fundamental fact for his science of 
social man called his Politics is that man is a "political animal" by 
which he means first of all an animal compelled to live in a social 
state with other like animals. Every society as a part of law de-
manded by nature must have a certain kind of law looking to the 
preservation of society. 
The above are the general physical facts of biology and anthropol-
ogy to which law must be adapted and accommodated. The next 
fact is that human beings are rational animals, and they have behind 
them a process of development by which the human mind became 
rational. In the progress of human beings through a time "mi-
endlich Zang'', they became capable of reflecting upon their sensa-
tions and of rationalizing them and of attaining self-consciousness, 
by which is meant that a human being at some point after birth is 
capable of making his own mind and the minds of other human 
beings the subject of his investigation, observation and thought. 
Just as the human embryo reproduces the physical development of 
the race, so the human mind in the individual from its capacity in 
the child to receive sensations without more, up to the stage of adult 
self-consciousness and rationality, reproduces the mental history of 
the race. Since the human mind has never existed except in the so-
cial state, the mind of man is a social mind trained only to life in a 
social state and no other condition. This social mind will govern 
man's life and institutions, and since law is the product of the so-
cial mind of human beings in a social state, the basic facts of 
psychology, the science of the social mind, as well as of sociology, the 
science of the social state, are bound to form and condition all 
human conceptions of law. This is no less true of the derivative 
social sciences, ethics, economics and politics. No man has ever 
been so deluded as to deny this self-evident fact. There is nothing 
new in this express recognition of the interdependence of law and 
the other social sciences, for Cicero has happily said in the opening 
of his legal argument for the poet Archias, which we construed 
when we were stumbling our beginners' way in Latin, that "all the 
sciences which concern human conduct have a kind of common bond 
and are related by a sort of blood kinship to one another''.1u 
"Duguit, The Law and the State, Harvard Law Rev., xx.'<i, 23. The most primitive 
types today and the human race as far back as it has been traced to the earliest types, 
Chellean, Mousterian, Aurignacian, Magdalenian, Cromagnon, Azilian and Solutrean are 
all social types. No fact is better settled in anthropology. 
"'Cicero pro Arch. 1. Etenim omnes arles quae ad lmmanitatem pertinent ltabent 
quoddam conun1<ne vinculum et quasi cog11atio11e quaddam inter .se co11ti11entur. 
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II. 
:FAC'l'S O:F 'l'HE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 
Since the social sciences are the result of the social human mi11d 
psychology comes first, but it happens that psychology and sociology 
are necessarily indissolubly bound together. It is necessary to go 
no further into psychology than to say that the mind as a product 
of an evolutionary process can not be divided into separate social 
and non-social faculties. In late years it has been demonstrated 
that no part of the rational power of the mind could have been 
developed if there had not been constant association and intercourse 
among !llen. But almost all the legal theorists lose sight of this fact. 
They assume that there is some contrariety between the individual 
mind and society, and hence the collectivists talk of the collective 
mind and its will, while the individualists talk of individualism. But 
both talk of the non-existent. The conception of a collective mind 
is a metaphysical abstraction pronounced palpably false by psychol-
ogy, which knows only individual minds, but individual minds de-
veloped by, trained in, adapted to, and impossible without, the so-
cial state. 
This individual social mind is the result of certain large factors, 
nowhere disputed, which result from the associated state. Espe-
cially is to be noted the influence of language, first spoken and later 
spoken and written, but men reached comparatively high stages of 
civilization before written language appeared.16 Without language 
men would be to each other what the other animals are to man. 
By means of language men share the minds of others. Without 
language, the realization of personality is a psychological impossi-
bility. The reasoning power which results from self-consciousness 
can arise only among men using languages and language belongs to 
the associated state. This long process of development brought 
men to the point where the mind was capable of benefiting by its 
own and by others' experiences. The mere dependence on external 
things ceased. The products in the mind of the senses ceased to 
be in any way of controlling importance. Ideas and trains of ideas 
shut out the things of mere sense. Man separated his inner self of 
thought from his self as a mere animal, obedient to the senses. But 
this whole development is, of course, the interaction of individual 
minds. The expansion of faculties came from knowledge gained of 
man's social self through language. The individual mind was en-
a It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the world's greatest epic took form 
among men who bad no written language. 
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abled to work back on itself and it was impossible for it to act and 
it was incapable of judging of acts solely with reference to the single 
self. No normal human being has ever had a mind that would en-
able him to avoid the judgment of his fellow men or to avoid action 
for his fellow men. Collective action for common ends is of the 
essence of society and man as a member of his social group, the tribe, 
later the collection of tribes, and the nation, taking thought for the 
common good, learned to take counsel with himself for his own 
good as bound up with the good of others. He gained the distinct 
adaptability to willingness to work for the common good and this 
willingness is a" permanent feature of his mind which he cannot lose. 
At last he became the so-called man of good will free and able volun-
tarily to choose the good for himself and for others. This he came 
to recognize as his true self, something better than his selfish self, 
and as his ideal answering to Browning's phrase that it is not what 
man does, but what man would do that exalts him. 
It may seem that we are far afield, but we are not, for half of 
legal philosophizing consists of a denial of the fundamental truths 
of evolutionary psychology. Psychology teaches that pleasure and 
pain are not mere conditions of simple sensation, but complex con-
ceptions of the mind, while the state called happiness is not de-
termined by pleasure or pain, but is the individual's realization of 
his own adaptation to his most complete functioning as a member 
of society. Thus long before we ever reach law we get rid once 
for all of the Benthamic theory of balancing pleasure and pain to 
find utility, for the proposition is psychologically impossible. Hap-
piness is the most intricately involved conception of the human mind 
and it gives the answer to the end of society as the utmost adapta-
tion of man in his development to his realization of his most perfect 
functioning as one of the social aggregate.17 This is the true social 
welfare, not because it is the greatest good of the greatest number, 
but because it results from a process of development that binds hu-
manity, and because the human mind is so constituted that it can 
in the long run seek no other end. To this we may properly apply 
the much abused word efficiency and say that law is necessarily 
"If the great mass of lawyers had been trained in what may be called the new 
psychology, and had not always had in mind the old psychology which kept the field 
Jong after evolution ought to have overthrown it, we should have heard Jess of the ego 
and far more of the true constitution of man's mind. Bentham's balancing to find utility 
of a man's pleasure in killing another against the pain caused by the act is a low, dis· 
gusting performance, eminently worthy of Bentham, but to a man capable of introspeer 
tion unthinkable. His elaborate expositions in his Principles of Morals and Legislation 
in Chapter four, "Value of a Lot of Pleasure or Pain", chapter five, "Pleasures and 
Pains, Their Kinds", and Chapter six, "Circumstances Influencing Sensibility'' are for 
psychology the greatest nonsense ever penned. 
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limited by the necessary constitution of the human mind, to the 
tendency in all men to seek the most complete development in ef-
ficiency of individuals in the social state. But since man can say, 
"Mine is the world of thought, the world of dream, 
Mine all the past and all the future mine," 
this efficiency is never alone a mere physical adaptation or pro-
ductiveness, but is a tendency to realize the most perfect adaptation 
of mind, and body reacting upon mind, to the highest development 
of each individual in the social state which is consistent with "the 
same development of every other individual. It is Matthew Arnold's 
idea of.a culture that is self-realized, not the German mechanical 
Kult11,r which eliminates the individual's self-realization. Thus 
after all, the end of society is the improvement of the individual, 
but as a part of society. As individuals gain in moral stature, so-
ciety progresses, as individuals decay, society decays. A legal theory 
of individualism which sacrifices society is as impossible in the long 
run from a psychological standpoint as a collectivism which inter-
feres with the highest and best development of the individual. This 
truth rids us of any collectivism which blunts or paralyzes men's 
moral conception. This at once disposes of the German theory that 
the state has no morality and can be amenable to no rules, that 
the state can be immoral, thieving, rapacious and murderous with-
out affecting the individual citizen. We get rid, too, of all socialistic 
theories which sacrifice society and individuals to a particular class. 
They are doomed from birth because they deny the essential mental 
·nature of man. 
But the actual fact that man never was and with his mind can 
never have been a solitary being, disposes once for all of the theory 
that society resulted from an agreement among individuals, the so-
cial contract or social compact theory, stated by Hobbes, followed 
by Locke, called by Rousseau the Contrat Social, stolen by Kant 
and Hegel for base uses, accepted by Austin, practically adopted by 
Spencer, made the basis of the Rights of Man doctrine that indi-
viduals agreeing to enter society retained all natural rights not nec-
essary to preserve society, and asserted in our Declaration of In-
dependence in its opening statement of certain "inalienable rights". 
It is useless to examine a theory that is opposed to actual fact and 
is as completely disproven as the flatness of the earth's surface. The 
answer is that it never really happened, and if it be assumed as a 
fiction, it is harmful, because it gives an impossible basis for the 
social aggregate. Yet while this is true, it is no less true that the 
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actual form of government, what Germans generally call the state, 
for which they predicate a transcendental basis, is a matter of agree-
ment or convention, because in many cases the actual time and place 
of the agreement can be proven as completely as the date of a con-
tract. But this shows the difference between the social organiza-
tion or the state, i. e., the society for which the government exists, 
and the actual form of governmental machinery. This distinction 
obviously proven by history and proven by the forming of the Ger-
man Empire itself by a written agreement, is an absolute refutation 
of the German theory of the state. They confuse the matter, and 
often deceive themselves, by using the word nation or state, now 
for society and now for the government as if the t\vo were identical 
and the terms interchangeable, a result to which they are prone, on 
account of the vagueness and lack of precision in the German lan-
guage. It is immensely to the credit of English or French or Italian 
that the verbal tumultuosities of Hegel or Kant could not have been 
written in those languages. 
Turning now to the other part of the psychological conception 
of the social mind, we come to the science of sociology. The term 
sociology is a hybrid made up of a Latin and a Greek word and 
until late years the science was as hybrid as the mule "without pride 
of ancestry or hope of posterity".18 One of its baldest impositions 
was the attempt to show that society was an organism in the sense 
that a living animal is an organism. No one ever disputed that 
society was an organization of human beings, but there is nothing 
more crass than Herbert Spencer's19 attempt to show from a biolog-
ical standpoint society as a single living organism by means of a 
long, involved, fallacious parallel between the growth, maturity and 
decay of a living organism and what he called the social organism. 
And when at last it appeared that his organic theory was irrecon-
cilably opposed to his extreme individualistic state theory, his re-
traction was nothing short of pitiful in the man and the manner of 
it was mentally dishonest in the philosopher. But gradually so-
ciology has worked itself away from impossible theories and the 
biological basis of the German state theory is gone. It is now based 
on nothing more substantial than metaphysics. Fact tells us that 
no two or more minds can function as one, any more than two or 
'"It will not be denied at this day that Comte sterilized sociology by his neglect of 
law and government. By his exclusion of these things from scientific treatment, he 
rendered a true sociology on his lines an impossibility. His science is called above a 
hybrid, but it produced certain results just as the "hinny", which is a cross between a 
stallion and a jennet, is sometimes fertile. The mule is always infertile. 
19 See Spencer's Sociology i, part 2, for the discussion. A host of imitators followed 
him. The most prominent is Schaffle in his Ba11 imd Leben des Socia/en Koerpers. 
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more animals can function as one.20 Metaphorically the state has 
been called a partnership, which is a better analogy, but best of all 
is Burke's superb phrase that any particular human society "is placed 
in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the worV 
and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body co.i1-
posed of transitory parts, wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous 
wisdom the whole, at one time, is never old or middle-aged or young, 
but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the 
varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression."21 
Governments may rise and fall, empires may flourish and decay 
and the social aggregate itself may remain. The usual term applied 
to the social aggregate considered as the state not as the govern-
ment, i~ a moral person. This means that it is to be coµsidered as a 
unity both in dealing with its own members and with other social 
aggregates and is thus bound by and amenable to the rules of moral-
ity as well as to the rules of international law founded on justice and 
morality. 
But while society cannot be conceived as a single thinking person 
except by a metaphysical fiction, modern sociology has demonstrated 
that society is evolving in the individual not the qualities, in Spenc-
er's narrow conception, which contribute alone to his own efficiency 
in the struggle for existence with his fellow men. We have ad-
vanced beyond the sabre-toothed tiger. Man has been developing 
by his social mind, rather the qualities which contribute to his own 
efficiency in making himself more capable as one of a social ag-
gregate which is thereby rendered more capable, more articulate, 
more humane and more just.22 This discovery now universally ac-
cepted demonstrates that there can be no enduring kind of law which 
is based on the theory that man is solely an egoistic, self-seeking in-
dividual and not a social individual, or that he is on the other hand 
to be disregarded for the social organization. But owing to the 
fact that most men see only one thing at a time, there are bound to 
be conflicting ideas of the function of law as governing men's con-
duct toward other men. The ideal is the adjustment of the in-
dividual to society and the social mind in its gradual improvement 
is constantly striving therefor, and law in the end is bound to seem 
to conform to "a double standard", but it is after all the single stan-
dard of the social mind. It is in the necessity for conforming to the 
,., No one denies, of course, that the social aggregate is something more than a 
mere civil corporation. 
n' Burke's Works (8th ed.) iii, 275. 
22 See Kidd's Individualism and After, Social Evolution and Two Principal Laws of 
Sociology, which are remarkable works. They belong to a: world other than the ideas 
of Comte. 
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standard of the social mind that is written the certain destruction 
of the German state theory that might is right. In the ancient world 
the failure of society and the individual was complete. Every civil-
ization perished, because there was no realization that the interests 
of all human societies are necessarily the same. The destruction of 
states by one another, the sacrifice of the growth of wealth and com-
merce to racial hostility or greed, was the failure to realize the in-
terests of general human society. It is more than an accident that 
the pa% Romana had its advent with the dissemination of the Chris-
tian belief in the oneness of humanity's interests. In this view 
Christianity is a part of the great social evolution and undoubtedly 
the greatest single factor. There never can be another Rome, since 
that stage of social evolution has long been passed. Just as in 
earlier society nothing was safe in the face of one strong marauder 
and his confederates, until the force of the whole society suppressed 
him by law, so in the society of nations the one strong marauder is 
bound to be suppressed by the realization of solidarity among civil-
ized nations and by international law. The historical development 
makes it plain, therefore, that the ultimate basis of law in a single 
society is the basis of international law among many nations. 
This general form of sociological development must be given a 
more particular application to. law. The efficiency of separate in-
dividuals in the social aggregate when added together must make up 
the efficiency of society.23 Now the individual efficiency always has 
been and always will be measured, roughly speaking, by his con-
tribution to the means of living, considering life both a physical and 
a mental state. This is a necessary postulate of the social mind and 
of the law of social development. The savage's efficiency is meas- . 
ured by the game he makes his own, by the goodness of his weapons 
and by the skillful use he makes of them. In all civilized life the 
same necessity for the accumulation of property follows man. In 
highly_ civilized societies the works of the intellect are under the 
same general rule. That there may be a contribution to the general 
stock of physical well being and mentality, requires the incentive of 
social estimation resulting from the individual's stock. This is the 
reason why as man has progressed more and more of different 
things have become the subject of property,24 even to the products 
of the mind in patent& for processes, in copyrights and trade designa-
23 The proposition that the whole is greater than its parts cannot be true if the in· 
dividual's efficiency comprises all his powers as one in society, although it is doubtless 
true that the efficiency of society is greater than that of the individuals considered as 
separate non-social units, which was the idea of Aristotle in his famous phrase. 
" The tendency of savages to thievery is due partly to the fact that they steal things 
which are unknown among them and hence not the subject of property. 
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tions. Hence property as a sociological fact begins with man ; there 
never was a time when private property was unknown. By the laws 
of man's development we know that communistic systems are 
doomed. That stage once passed can never be regained except r · 
recurring to a lower stage of life which requires a psychologi1..<1I 
alteration in men, for no law can be possible that is opposed to the 
fundamental constitution of the average human mind. 
The sociological law stated in another way is that the ideal of 
social evolution is the perfect division of labor, physical and mental, 
considering as labor every possible human activity that contributes 
to efficiency. The materials of sociology are matters of fact, neces-
sarily of historical fact. Beginning with the savage, history shows 
that so~iety's expansion has been a widening of the number of those 
to whom social duties are owed. This is a necessary result of in-
creasing division of labor, and we find the fundamental conception 
of economics agrees, as it must, with the deeper fundamental con-
ception of sociology. In all ancient civilizations human institutions 
rested solely on force, outlanders were natural enemies,25 conquered 
enemies became slaves. The state as the government was absolute 
against the individual and had "neither moral nor legal limits i:o 
its power'', and thus the government was absolutely identified with 
the society over which it ruled.26 Slavery was necessarily its eco-
nomical basis, and even philosophers like Aristotle thought it natural. 
It was natural only because of man's inadequacy to social conditions. 
In such a society there could be no proper division of labor, but 
it realized its efficiency in a conquering war-like organization which 
supplied the best army and the most servile labor. Everywhere that 
men developed the works of peace, wealth and commerce, came the 
conquering power of some mighty military organization. Readily 
recur to mind the Egyptian war-chariots, the Assyrian bowmen, the 
Persian cavalry, the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion. 
The policy of the ancient state with its dominant ideas was bound 
to result in one universal dominion, which alone would survive and 
25 Among savages the tendency to steal from outsiders is marked. The German state 
theory is an attempt to project this state of mind among civilized nations. 
"°This it will appear is the theory of Kant and Hegel and Germans have never 
gotten beyond the standpoint of the ancient world. In all that tiresome work, Hegel's 
Philosophy of History, he "shows no inkling of understanding that the world even in his 
day had passed beyond that point. It has been said with good reason that the Prussian, 
at least, has never become a part of modern civilization. Goethe believed he never could 
become so. Plato's Republic with his ruling class, warrior class, and his third class to 
labor in the arts and handicrafts, in the fields and in commerce, is not different from 
a society where all human industry is only of importance as it props the military power. 
To quote Lasson's x .. 1111rideal again: "Tlie canuon is tlie most important part of tlie 
weaving loom." 
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which· represented the acme of then unrestrained national competi-
tion. But the Empire brought peace and with it the spread of 
Christianity and its conception of a social force transcending a 
group of tribes, a people, a race, a nation. In peace division of 
labor substituted an industrial organization throughout the Empire. 
This organization yielded for a time to barbarian inroads, but the 
gradual social expansion disintegrated the feudal military society 
resting on slavery and undermined the power of the barbarian ruling 
class. The result was a constantly increasing division of labor which 
promoted toleration against bigotry, and brought about the same 
increase in the efficiency of the individual and society, the growth 
again of wealth and commerce. Had it not been for the German con-
ception of the state, its wille zur macht, the social expansion long 
ago would have realized an international law accepted by all so-
cieties, and the Federation of the World would have been realized. 
But the menace of a great military system required the arming of 
neighboring states for self-defense. Only corrupt or imbecile Russian 
doctrinaires could expect a durable state of security before the 
menace was destroyed. We in America never noticed it in our 
colonial existence far from the main current of the world's affairs. 
And just as a national law is demanded in a particular society, so 
an international law is demanded among all societies. It remains 
to be seen, and the issue is not doubtful, whether the power of in-
dustrial society will overcome the organization of a military society. 
The tendency. to wide conquest of civilized states can no longer be 
characteristic of the highest social organization. It is now a moral 
outrage and a social anachronism. The public opinion of the world 
is too powerful. Marxian socialism, the attempt of a class to rule 
in a particular society, is just as surely gone as its counterpart among 
nations. But the essence of the situation is that at last nations have 
developed the necessary social force behind international law that 
was required in each particular society to form a base for its na-
tional law. 
But this general view of economics needs to be supplem'ented by 
more particular statements. Concerted collective action for social 
improvement is a necessary concept of the human mind. Law is 
bound to serve in the effort to increase individual social efficiency, 
and the division of labor. A discerning man can see that the whole 
of the law of contract as developed both in the civil and the common 
law is far more significant than Sir Henry Maine's generalization 
that it is a passage of society away from a condition of status. It 
is a necessity resulting from an increasing division of labor im-
possible without contract. Let any man who thinks that courts 
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make law ponder this to find what actually makes law-the power 
of social development in whose grasp courts and men stand as help-
less and chidden as the Greeks felt that the gods stood before tht> 
eyes of Fate.27 Obviously the mass of labor legislation is due ,) 
the same cause. Many errors in legislation are bound to be made 
in the attempt to assist the natural growth. Dominant popular 
ideas on economics are generally stupid, and this is the real diffi-
culty with popular legislation. Our long career of wild-cat bank-
ing, our absurd independent treasury, our rank greenback phase, our 
deluded silver obsession, our present system of gross inflation under 
the Federal Reserve Law28 all show these mistaken efforts. 
The legislation forced by popular economics in the way of ap-
propriating one man's earnings to another man must always stop at 
the point of a great impairment of individual efficiency measured by 
producing power expressed in terms of property. As soon as the 
insistence upon the supposed social welfare proceeds beyond that 
point, private property, inheritance, wills and succession will be 
imperiled and by the law of social development resulting from the 
basic constitution of the human mind, the deeper tendency of society 
to preserve itself will overcome the menace or society will disin-
tegrate. If society has reached the stage of a nation, the national 
2T This thought is from Swinburne, I believe, but I have not attempted to verify the 
quotation. The idea is that the Greeks believed that men stood chidden before the eyes 
of the gods as they before the eyes of Fate. 
2S The government printing presses and the serried ranks of the finance professors 
have been continuously sounding the praises of the Federal Reserve Law. It was the 
work of impractical professorial theorists while the legal draughtsman was below con· 
tempt. A few men skilled in finance pointed out its dangers. The inflation and the con· 
tinuous disuse of gold have done much for high prices, which are elevated by the de-
creasing purchasing power of gold. It is so easy to delude the public by blaming some· 
thing else that it is useless to point out the errors on which the Reserve Law is based, 
and its increasing injustice toward all classes of peOple. If the country had done what 
it ought, (1) abolished national bank notes and had the government bear the greater part 
of the loss on the bonds, (z) abolished the greenbacks by retiring them, (3) retired the 
silver notes, the most notorious swindle in the world, (4) legalized the issuance of notes 
under the clearing houses guarding the issues so as to force retirement, (5) prohibited 
all paper money under ten dollars, ( 6) abolished the independent treasury, we should 
have seen a different situation. The pretence that the Federal Reserve Banks are of any 
benefit is constantly asserted by sciolists, but their functions could better have been per· 
formed by the allied clearing houses, a natural, not a forced growth. Had the six things 
above been done, the increase in prices, if any, would have been only the result of the 
war, and due in no.pa;t to inflation by disusing gold. As it is, every man's producing 
power has been continuously marked down because measured by a medium that has been 
continuously decreasing in purchasing power, assisted by a wholly unnecessary inflation, 
but it is of no use to say this, because Ephraim was no more joined to his idols than 
our people to paper money. Now we hear of a great United States Bank, the objections 
to which were the only excuse for the Federal ~erve System. But this new proposal 
seems to be for a promoters' bank. 
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life will overcome the obstacles.29 If that spirit is not sufficiently 
developed, the nation and the society it represents will pass away, 
as did the worthless government of Poland. Social development 
in some other form will incorporate such a disintegrated society. To 
prevent misconception it is here to be said that in war the effort be-
ing by the social aggregate to preserve itself, the appropriation of 
private property may go to any extent, provided the business or-
ganization is kept functioning. Destroy that and chaos will result. 
In Germany today the business organization is no more. All prop-
erty existing and becoming is pooled. The form of business activity 
is kept up by an endless chain of credit coming back to paper money 
and bonds. Every one is fed from the government pool, and the 
business organization is not functioning at all. Far beyond the 
losses of war will be the result and Germany's actual difficulties will 
only begin when peace requires the dissolution of the militaristic 
pool. Even the Prussian cannot be converted into a complete "slave 
of the lamp". This is the sole question in Russia. Has it sufficient 
national feeling resulting in social coherence to overcome the gyra-
tions of law attempting the destruction of individual efficiency? 
The incapacity of the Slav for self-government, his credulous im-
becility, no less apparent in the Russian than in the Prussian masses30 
presages the worst. But the law in our country has survived num-
berless Bolsheviki. The Adamson law passed by Congress at the 
command of the Bolshevist dictators sitting in the galleries dis-
gusted the country beyond expression. Now and then a typical 
specimen of Bolsheviki attains high judicial position, but under our 
system he is like a rogue elephant surrounded by tame ones and 
cannot do much harm. We have survived, so why may they not 
ride out the storm in Russia? 
Happily it is only after man has reached a comparatively high 
stage of civilization that society consciously attempts economic leg-
islation. Prior to that time all such law is the slow and gradual 
ZJ A case in point is the railroads. Legislation assaulted them. The Interstate Com• 
merce Commission carried out the work of destruction by pandering to popular feeling. 
The railroads were rendered helpless, for proper protection in the courts was denied 
them in the woefully wrong cases which held the Sherman law applicable to railroads. 
Now the government seizes the roads to prevent a calamity, and it will raise the rates, 
and pool the roads. All this roundabout folly was caused by an initial error rendering 
necessary other and greater errors. Thus fate laughs at the courts and legislation. 
""The great racial basis of the Prussians is Slavic. When Quatrefages, the great 
anthropologist, was brought to Berlin to ascertain the racial descent of the Prussians, he 
demonstrated that in the mass they were Slavs with an admixture of Tartar repulsiveness, 
and with no infusion of Germans except in the ruling class. Thereupon the Prussian 
zeal over die Herbiinft suffered a perceptible diminution. Bluntschli in his Theory of 
the State (English Translation), p. 11, speaks of the Prussians as having "the pliancy and 
submissiveness of the Slav." 
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growth of massed individual experiences hardening into imperious 
customs, under many of which as positive law we live today. This 
is why the economic legislation of custom never goes backward, 
while conscious economic legislation is generally erroneous. 
The derivative social science of economics has been noted. 'I ne 
derivative sciences of morality and law are the product mainly of 
the moral ideas of right and justice. It is useless to speculate on 
the aeons required to develop the general concepts which we call the 
moral ideas. They were an infinitely slow and gradual growth. 
Men came instinctively to think and act in a certain way. The 
moral ideas represented numberless individual inductions of the 
social mind slowly developing. These inductions were individual 
judgmep.ts upon numberless concrete states of fact and at length 
a rule of conduct instinctively felt to be just was gradually evolved. 
The mental processes by which this moral idea has been arrived 
at were forgotten and became the "broken potsherds of the past".31 
In the same way the allied instinctive conception of right was later 
evolved and those ideas of justice and right became moral ideas 
with which every normal social mind was furnished. The idea of 
the rightful is no longer furnished by a process of reasoning any 
more than is the idea of justice, as the Socratic dialogues show. 
Yet these instinctive ideas became in the mind the directing factors 
of deliberate reasoning for making moral judgments. These moral 
ideas are, however complex, not simple notions. They may be 
analyzed and all are now fairly agreed that the fundamental notion 
at the basis of justice results as a necessity of men living in a social 
state, and that is that all men in the most homogeneous state of 
society are entitled to the same recognition, that is to an equal right 
to an equal recognition. All the philosophers consider justice as 
having, therefore, two categorical imperatives, freedom and equality. 
Equality requires equal action upon different men, which must be 
arrived at by general rules. The idea of justice instinctively asserts 
in this reaching after equality that when a man has done something 
to another which reduces that other below the level of equal recog-
nition, the one so acting must submit to the other's getting back 
to the same level with the aggressor. This is the normal human 
feeling whether we call it the lex talionis or compensation in dam-
ages or punishment proportioned to the offence. Thus we arrive 
at the fundamental notion of justice which is equality before the 
at It is nothing less than genius that enabled Pascal to venture the generalization, most 
extraordinary for bis time: "Qii'est-ce-que la nature! peutetre une premiere coutume, 
comme la couti1me est 1111e scconde nature." He was probably anticipated by Montaigne 
in bis essay on Custom. 
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developed social custom. Roughly the notion is that what a man 
has caused another to suffer, he should suffer himself. Thus in 
the code of Khammurabi, which dates probably from 2200 B. C.,32 
when Babylonia was at a high stage of civilization under a written 
code, which survived the Persian, Greek and Parthian conquests and 
still in part exists as law, we read that if a builder build a house 
so that it fall and kill the owner, let the builder be put to death, 
but if it kill the son of the owner, let the builder's son be put to 
death. It required ages to disentangle the son by reasons based on 
better conceptions of justice. The sentiment of equality in recom-
pense was called in religion expiation, in morals it was retribution, 
in law it was punishment or reparation. This general notion is as 
strong today as it ever was, for it is a formative concept of the 
social mind. When a mob goes forth to lynch a malefactor it is 
acting in obedience to this primal sense of justice. Legal phil-
osophers, however, rarely recognize this part of human nature. They 
conceive that men are all docile pupils to be harangued, admonished 
or rebuked as in the class-room, and the Germans are the sort of 
docile people who endure such treatment. The criminologists are 
always forgetting that they must leave room for the human feeling 
that in an atrocious or peculiarly unjust case men instinctively de-
sire to see one who has hurt another, himself hurt to approximately 
the same degree. 
The other phase of the sense of justice is that men to be equally 
treated must be treated with impartiality. This requires as a basic 
concept of justice general rules applied to all self-regarding men 
imbued with the social idea. We say that if a court is biased or 
prejudiced it is unjust; we mean that it is not impartial. If a 
court is venal, or corrupt, or swayed by motives no less corrupt 
so well known among.us through the judge who wears some power-
ful politician's collar of SS, or the judge who seeks to meet the 
wish~s of the appointing power or the judicial creature who seeks 
to please the populace, the sense of equal treatment, of impartiality, 
of equality before the law is violated. The cynic might say that 
things being what they are among us, there is not much chance for 
a correct_administration of the law. We all have suffered from 
"the backstairs" to judicial chambers and few lawyers have not 
had juries offered for a price, but courts in their individual in-
32 There is a hook well worth reading, although the first few chapters are sufficient. 
It is called The Origin and Development of the Moral Emotions by Westermarck, an 
Anglicized Dane, who like most sociologists would find himself in congenial company 
among the Bolsheviki, but there is a great mass of material in two large volumes. AU 
the German material has been sifted. The German writer to be consulted is Wundt. 
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justices deal merely in individual judgments. Courts must all pre-
tend to general and impartial rules and even if they serve the devil 
must to the general eye wear the spotless ermine of an impartial trib-
unal. 
The dominant notion is that every one can justly ask from u.n-
other what the other can justly ask from him.33 The snuffy old 
Kant at Konigsberg announced with a great flourish upon his 
metaphysical contra-bombardon, the largest of the brass wind-in-
struments, that he had discovered the basic principle of all law 
which was so to act that your rule of action could become a gen-
eral law. The lawyers turned from him in disgust for he pretended 
to have newly discovered the golden rule and was merely editing 
the S.el1llon on the Mount and the tenth commandment. As a mat-
ter of fact he was announcing what the lawyers had laid down for 
almost two thousand years as the fundamental notion for the idea 
of justice.34 It reminds us of the famous witticism of Speaker 
Reed who said that he could never forget the inspiring spectacle of 
a certain politician's pride and joy at discovering the ten command-
ments. While all men who are rational are ready to acknowledge 
that justice requires for law general rules applicable to all alike, 
the legal difficulty has just been reached. This general rule must 
be applied to single cases of concrete fact. But of necessity every 
human act that has moral significance produces a moral judgment. 
This moral judgment may be applied inwardly to an act contem-
plated.35 It is to this sphere that many German philosophers at-
tempt to confine morality. But a contemplated act when done may 
tum out not as contemplated and the whole moral judgment goes 
astray. This is of little importance to the law since it regards onJy 
human acts actually done which affect other persons. Such acts, if 
03 It may be needless to point out that the tenth commandment: "Thou shalt not 
covet" is the widest application of this rule. Precisely the same is Menander's fragment: 
"Choose equality and eschew covetousness". Menander never heard of the Jewish law, 
hut a quotation from him, "Evil communications corrupt good manners," came through 
St. Paul into our burial service. 
"'The Institutes I, 1, I borrowing from Cicero through the jurisconsults, define 
justice: Justitia est constans et perpetua 11olu11tas jus suum cuique tribuere, usually 
translated "justice is the constant and perpetual willingness to render to each one his 
due". It means, however, "to render to each one his right''. At the basis of the idea 
of justice lies the conception that what is due to each man all men have the right to claim. 
35 It ought to go without saying that justice which concerns alone conduct toward 
other men developed long before any introspective ideas of one's own conduct. Looking 
outwards precedes looking inwards as a psychological necessity. Right became a much 
wider generalized thought than justice. It contained not only all the conceptions of 
justice, but it carried all the notions involved in correct conduct where justice was not 
concerned. Hence it is that men's moral ideas of right and justice do not agree, but 
right as the more vivid concept prevails. 
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they have moral significance, at once become the subject of a moral 
judgment, but if they are of legal significance, they give rise also 
to a legal judgment. The moral judgment is governed by the in-
stinctive moral ideas, while the legal judgment, as we shall see, is 
merely a deduction by a process of reasoning applying the general 
rule of law to the concrete case. The moral judgment may or may 
not correspond with the rule of law applicable by reasoning. But 
since the human mind is a unity the intensity of the moral judgment 
and the intensity of the legal judgment as to any act may vary 
greatly. The more intense the moral judgment, the more certain 
the legal judgment, is to yield in the case of an ordinary individual. 
Perhaps he may not know the legal rule applicable. Perhaps he 
may know it beforehand. At any rate the ordinary individual fol-
lows his moral "judgment and pronounces the differing legal rule 
very unjust. If men were so constituted that they could work one 
faculty at· a. time, we should not find this difficulty, but the human 
mind is a unity and works all together. This defect of the human 
mind is not noticeable as long as law is automatically working rns-
tonv, but as soon as law becomes rational, the defect is apparent. 
Hence the necessity for _specially trained minds whose legal knowl-
edge and power of legal judgment are so developed that they are 
able to disregard conflicting moral judgments. Hence it is that 
after law has passed the stage where it is generally known to the 
great mass of the commuriity as rigid custom, it is necessary to have 
a specially trained body of men called lawyers, who alone are cap-
able of legal judgments, generally speaking. The idiots who ask 
that every man be his own lawyer and that the courts be filled with 
men who, in their phrase, know "less law and more justice" are 
simply quarreling with the constitution of the human mind and 
asking to have civiiization set back three thousand years. 
This view of the matter is not exhausted without noticing the 
further fact that there are certain general rules in regard to right and 
justice that all rational men at a given stage in a particular society 
will agree upon as just and right. Those general rules as to mat-
ters of importance in the conduct of men toward each other will 
generally be embodied in the law. But every general rule made 
from the moral standpoint is likely to be swept away as soon as a 
concrete case is presented involving some particular circumstance 
appealing to the moral ideas. This can best be illustrated by a case 
put by a Grecian sage over twenty-four hundred years ago and 
stated, I think, in Plutarch's Morals. An importer of grain on 
the Island of Rhodes had in the harbor a vessel of grain just ar-
rived from Egypt. Owing to a scarcity of grain on the island, the 
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price had risen beyond all measure and the grain merchant can ask 
what he pleases. But he knows what no one else knows that a haif 
dozen ships will arrive in a day or two and then the supply will 
exceed the demand and the price will fall to normal or below. T, 
the importer bound to disclose his knowledge to purchasers? G11e 
school of Grecian philosophers and Cicero, the greatest of Roman 
lawyers-greatest because he is so much more than a lawyer that 
he is one of the five first class men of letters the world has pro-
duced-answered the question "yes", but the Stoics answered "no, 
the importer was under no obligation to disclose". The Roman law 
followed Cicero and imposed the duty of disclosure on both vendor 
and purchaser, hence in our law the assured applying for marine 
insuran~e is bound to disclose the facts relevant to the risk, because 
our insurance law comes from the civil law, and as applied to in-
surance of vessels, the rule of law seems reasonable. But in the 
meantime, the common law had answered the question in another 
way. The vendor is bound only by express or implied warranty, 
the common law with its well known practical sense assumed that 
the purchaser can call for no disclosure except in a relation of con-
fidence. The vendor does enough if he tells the truth as to matters 
material if inquired of. Now this is a general proposition of law 
which has, when no concrete instance is involved, a variable moral 
aspect. But suppose the bargainer for grain be a poor widow whose 
necessities compel her to sacrifice her all for grain for herself and 
children. At once we are on different ground. The ordinary man 
is revolted and he says that the rich importer who grinds the faces 
of the poor is a rascal who should be compelled to disgorge. The 
abstract rule means nothing to him in the face of what seems a 
gross breach of right. The law becomes a travesty on justice and 
in the confused idea of the Apostle, the law has been unlawfully 
used, and if the law is, as Cicero says in his eleventh Philippic, ~ 
just sanction from on high jttbens lzonesta et prohibens contraria., 
a phrase repeated by Justinian's compilers and by our revered 
Blackstone, a definition which is every day being used by courts 
in the rural districts, the law is not what it is claimed to be. 
It is plain that in some cases the application of a general rule, 
and the rule must be general resulting from an imperative coII'mand 
of the general notion of justice, will violate the popular sense of 
justice or right applied to a concrete case. Law, except as custom 
among poorly developed peoples, can not stand the strain. Hence 
will arise the problem of how in particular cases to get rid of the 
general rule while drawing a veil of decency over the process 
Aristotle met the problem by saying that epieikeia or reasonable· 
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ness should vary the rule. But this leaves no rule at all. The Ro-
man aeqttitas mitigated the rule of law just as the English equity 
did, but by an inevitable process equity develops its general rules. 
To some extent the sense of a particular equity gives an opportunity 
to apply the moral judgment to a particular case. As long :is the 
rules of law are custom this process answers to a limited exknt. 
But as soon as we have legislation the hard and fast general rule 
is in a statute which provides for no exceptions, but forbids them. 
'!'he great discussion going on as to free judicial decision in the 
interpretation of statutes is a present professorial agitation \"hich 
would leave nothing of the general effect of a statute but all to the 
judgment of the judge. But this is useless, the legislature would 
soon put the courts trying free judicial decision beyond :ill pos-
sibility of interference.36 What the professors cooly propose ;O the 
judges is the commission of impeachable offences. 
A system of law which in its administration does not provide for 
varying the general rule to suit specific cases having a moral aspect 
will not endure in a civilized community. Popular courts like the 
Athenian dicasts or the Roman centumviral courts or the Anglo-
Saxon county courts attained the result because the violation of the 
rule was veiled in a judgment of many people. In English law 
the original assize, then the jury, reached the same result. First, 
the jury of twelve as sole witnesses to the fact and then the jury 
with their verdict binding as the fact upon the court relieved the 
court of the odium of opposing popular judgment and enabled the 
popular ideas to set aside in the particular case the general rule, 
by the simple device of a general verdict which blended the rule 
of law and the facts in a general finding for one party or the other. 
In criminal cases this is buttressed by the further rule that the 
verdict of acquittal of the jury cannot be set aside for any error 
however great. In cases of a judgment wrong to the moral sense 
of many people, the jury bears the odium of an unjust verdict. 
This device reaches free judicial decision whenever a statute comes 
in question, but this sort of setting aside of the general rule is just 
what is not desired by the professors, who advocate free judicial 
decision.37 Plainly if the moral judgments of men were to govern 
26 See the Science of Legal Method, Select Essays; the paper by Geza Kiss (Take 
heed, ye tuneful Nine) is a Hunnish view. The most absurd of it all is a paper by 
Wurzel who, according to Professor Kocourek, gives us to be "born anew into a realm 
of clear thinking and perpetual disillusionment". The trouble with the professors is that 
they wish to abolish human nature. Since the days of Plowden this question of free 
judicial decision in the interpretation of statutes has been worn threadbare. 
31 In the United States and England no legislative power would listen to judges vary-
ing statutes to suit special cases. Where there is a Reichstag or a Reichsrath and a 
310 ivIICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
there would be no general rule of law in any case presenting a strong 
ethical aspect contrary to the rule. All men are entitled to equal 
justice under general rules except those who in the opinion of 
many people are not entitled to it The result is bound to be . · 
compromise, but surely it is best arrived at by smothering unc.ier 
a thick fog of administration the refusal to accord the citizen the 
benefit of the general rule of law. It is certainly better than to ask 
a judge to violate his oath of office or to bring the courts into popu-
lar disrepute. After all the vast mass of cases are the very doubt-
ful. The whole subject is relative. The general considerations of 
justice, the needs for human security, the general public welfare, 
the need of honesty, good faith and fair dealing, the general recog-
nition Qf the rights of property, of the necessity for keeping con-
tracts, the injunction to refrain from injuring others, will in the 
end give substantially sound results as applied to the great mas!; 
of human conduct legally affecting others. 
The influence of psychology, sociology and the social mind has 
been surveyed. The science of economics was found to be bound 
up with sociology. The sciences of law and morality were found 
to be closely connected. The science of politics comes next. In 
this sphere racial characteristics and historical development will dic-
tate the great mass of what is called public law. The form of gov-
ernment, the relations of citizens to the government are purely mat-
ters of conventional law modified by historical circumstances. Up 
to a certain point the sentiment of justice as civilization develops 
will tend more and more to the abolition of caste and of class dis-
tinctions and the sentiment of equality which is but a phase of 
justice, will more and more assume a strong moral aspect. Female 
suffrage is now as much a moral question as slavery formerly was. 
The case of Minor v. H appersett, 88 a much respected deliverance of 
our revered Supreme Court, which held that female suffrage pre-
sented no moral aspect, now sounds like a doleful noise from the 
Dark Ages. Generally speaking the more democratic governments 
show the higher civilizations since they require a higher degree of 
the social sense and of self-control in the citizens and realize more 
thoroughly the sentiment of equality. Social distinctions in the realm 
ef the conventions, of manners and non-legal rules of behavior 
will not be affected by law, but legal distirictions resulting from dis-
criminations by law will more and more tend to realize the ideal of 
judiciary trained to respond to any governmental suggestion, the discussion may have 
some relevancy. Here it is simply nonsense. 
aa .2? Wall 16.2. But under Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, we may still disfranchise 
Germans when they become polygamists and emigrate to this country. 
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equality. Perhaps in this realm the claim for social justice, so-
called, should be placed, but that is more properly a phase of eco-
nomics and the demand of a class. Its essential effort, to try to 
render inferiority or mediocrity equal to capacity and ability, can 
never be approximated until mental capacity in the mass of men 
reaches a greater uniformity. Law has rendered physical differ-
ences among men of little account, but mental differences it cannot 
reach. In the meantime, outside the realm of law, the labor organ-
izations will insist on the leveling process, but their work is neces-
sarily confined to their own guilds, and is of no more importance 
than the work of the mediaeval guilds. Leveling in a class will 
never achieve any result, except to furnish places of command and 
large emoluments to needy leaders. The law will be used, how-
ever, to appropriate as much as possible of the results of the ef-
ficiency of capacity to the reparation of the lack of results of the 
inefficiency of inferiority. That pleasant process will stop when 
the efficiency of the individual is too far confiscated or threatened. 
But judging by the past, the mental powers of capacity will enable 
it to keep well ahead of the law's effort to appropriate its earnings 
by the most magnificent philanthropy that the world has ever seen. 
Thus far we are able to say as the result of the social sciences 
that law must consist of general rules, that "the machinery of ad-
ministration of the law must provide some method of decently 
veiling violations of the general rule in particular cases which will 
necessarily come when law passes the stage of rigid customs. But 
as a necessary part of the moral idea of justice and as a psychological 
necessity of the human mind the general rule of law to be applied 
to a particular case must be conceived as existing before the par-
ticular concrete case to which it is to be applied occurred. This is 
a matter of mental science, and is not a matter of law. It is a ques-
tion that must be settled before law is considered as a product of 
the human mind. 
Since the sense of justice is an original moral idea closely con-
nected with the sense of right, it is certain that the rules of law 
which have any moral significance must conform to the moral ideas. 
Therefore it is plain that the great part of law whkh is dictated 
by moral ideas may properly be called natural law. As a part of 
natural law must come as a necessary result of a developing sense 
of social solidarity an international law regulating the relations of 
nations to each other. This law is bound to conceive each nation 
as a social aggregate acting through its government, where the dif-
ferent social aggregates are bound by the rules of natural law based 
upon the sense of justice, of equality and of rendering to each na-
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tion its right as an equal with all other nations. Hence, interna-
tional law has been rightly conceived by Grotius and his school as 
natural law developed by human reason. The accident that there 
exists no common tribunal to enforce it has no bearing upon it, 
claim to be called actual positive law. 
III. 
SPHERES OF HUMAN CONDUC'l'. 
We come now to the field of legal judgments upon human con-
duct and the sphere of conduct that is subject to legal judgments. 
We kn9w that the largest part of human life never touches law 
in any manner. The great mass of men never have a lawsuit. 
Compared to the totality of human life, the sphere of law is a 
very small part of it. The spheres of life governed by rule may 
be called the sphere of the conventional and the proper, the sphere 
of the moral, and the sphere of the legal. A large part of the con-
duct of human beings is dictated by received ideas of the customary, 
fitting and proper. This is by far the larger part of human life. 
The rules-of law rarely, if ever, touch this sphere, unless such in-
stances as indecent exposure or public drunkenness or blasphemous 
conduct forbidden by law and such like things may be considered 
as rules of the becoming enforced by law. But no civilized man 
ever avoided indecent exposure because he feared the law, nor 
would such a law be necessary except as to certain degraded foreign-
ers of the lowest condition. The drunkard is not affected by penal-
ties against drunkenness any more than the religious crank refrains 
from public expression on account of a penalty. Human beings 
have standards of conduct and follow them as implicitly and per-
haps with more instinctive readiness than they would follow rules 
whose infraction brings punishment. These standards vary with 
the various walks of life and are enforced merely by public opinion. 
Such things have no more moral significance than one's clothes. 
Once, however, the law as custom ventured into this field, and still 
among less civilized peoples governs matters of caste. In our own 
country, where the standards of civilization are lower, caste shown 
by color is a matter of legal importance. But among highly civilized 
men the law has nothing to do with this field. In some frontier 
communities such a breach of good manners as the refusal to drink 
with another may lead to bloodshed, but it is a mistake to call such 
people civilized, though curiously enough, at the last general elec-
tion they appeared as strong pacifists. Juries in those benighted 
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regions have condoned murders in deference to a crude public opin-
ion. 
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these rules do 
not affect law. These ideas of the suitable, the proper and the con-
ventional differ with different classes. The man who robustly feeds 
himself with a knife and is contemptuous toward the use of napery 
feels a natural disgust at the conduct of other social orders. J eal-
ousies felt by one class toward another in the realm of legislation 
have a potent effect. Many a legislator votes for a foolish bill be-
cause it will please some class of people. In the administration 
of the law matters of class have often a great effect upon juries 
and even upon judges who may happen to have in some things 
liberality of thought and broadness of vision. Witnesses who testify 
may have their credibility entirely ruined by appearing to have vio-
lated these rules, so that they indirectly have often a strong in-
fluence in the ascertainment of the facts to which the law is to be 
applied. A litigant finds himself persona 11011 grata to a jury or a 
judge on account of some defect in manners or mode of thought 
which has nothing to do with the merits of his case. All men sooner 
or later find that they must conform to ordinary public feeling on 
matters not defined by or made the subject of law. These rules 
are of very great effect upon racial enmities. One nation classes 
another according to its manners. We all remember the noble and 
high-born Baron von und zu Krautschloppen, how disgusting were 
his table-manners, how raucous his methods of food absorption. 
Such a man 'creates a great prejudice against his country wherever 
he goes. 
The next field of human conduct is that great mass of human 
acts which are the subject of the individual's ideas of right or wrong, 
but which are not the subject of legal rules. Here we reach the 
domain of morality (already discussed) not a little com 1licated by 
religious beliefs. The science of morals, so-called, wil. never be 
an exact science because it concerns the instinctive judgments of the 
moral consciousness. What some men think right others think 
wrong, yet in the rough most men at any given time in a particular 
society think the same things to be right or wrong. There are 
certain fundamental simple virtues, such as goodness of heart, 
generosity, cheerfulness, mercy, compassion, kindliness, charity, 
self-restraint and self-control, which most men instinctively ad-
mire. These virtues have a moral aspect. They render life and 
human intercourse kindly and genial, they give a man standing 
and reputation among his fellows. Their greatest effect is upon the 
individual who by such qualities is so highly civilized that he finds 
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obedience to law not only a pleasure, but a matter of necessary 
conduct. But none of these matters ordinarily is enforced by rules 
of law though in the administration of the law a witness or a litigant 
whose conduct shows some particular circumstance of underhanr 
edness, cupidity, avarice, disregard of others, lack of kindly feeli .. g, 
brutality, or any of the thousand and one things which lawyers look 
for on the opposite side, or fear and avoid on their own, which too 
have no relevancy to the facts or the law, may absolutely determine 
a case whether before jury or judge.39 
But the orbits of law and morality cross each other. The difficulty 
is not avoided by saying that every violation of law is immoral. Of 
course, it is not true, for all the law of procedure has no moral 
signific~nce except in its equality, and a man who commits contempt 
of court has committed no moral offence, very often his act is ex-
ceedingly moral and courageous before a drunken judge. Even a 
mass of criminal law defines no immoral acts. On the other hand, 
many immoral acts are not illegal. Just how wrong certain con-
duct must be to be forbidden by law is problematical. The great 
mass of right conduct is not defined by law. It is just at this point 
that we return a nos moutons Allemands. Here the German legal 
philosophers have attempted a veiled but systematic assault upon 
the science of law by the dogma, wholly metaphysical, that morality 
concerns merely a man's inward state of mind while law governs 
his external conduct toward others. To this view morality never 
touches legality, and therefore the state even if subject to legal 
rules, whatever it may do, can never touch the sphere of morality. 
One of the most dangerous, because one of the most artful -0£ 
the "smugglers" of adulterated German metaphysics, either self-
designated or detailed by authority, was Hugo Miinsterberg for 
whose activities Harvard in a burst of unusually dense colonialism 
had given a place. He has been the I anus bifrons of this German 
propaganda. He began by giving us the rechauffe fragments of his 
former writings in German not too strong for American daily 
food. But at last he came fonvard with his "The Eternal Values" 
which is a German mystification of the eternal verities. No doubt, 
oo Lord Haldane, whose mind had become confused by much German, in his address 
before the American Bar Association, in 1913, at Montreal, (Rep. Am. Bar Assn. xxxviii, 
393) called that part of daily conduct which was not dictated by law, that part which 
was dictated by the rules of the fitting and proper, by the German word Sittlichkeit, but 
all through his address he mingled the ideas of the decorous with the ideas of morality. 
There is no such use in German of Sittlichkeit that is established. It is the ordinary 
word for morality. Fichte used the word to denote conduct which is not based on 
morality or law. He said moral conduct rests upon choice. This is a true German 
distinction, namely, none at all, for moral judgments are just as much instinctive as 
judgments of the fitting, proper or decorous. 
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he thought the time, 1909, was propitious. The war was coming, 
as the Germans alone knew, and we were to follow the German 
triumphal car in the harness of the German-American Alliance. He 
announced, of course, as many men do and some of them succeed 
with it for a time, that he had something freshly minted from the 
great treasury of his mind,4° the "new idealism". It is the old 
metaphysical trash that began with Geist and ends with Kultur. 
Like most Germans he is sadly confused as to morality in other 
ways,41 but his main offence is his theory of the relation between 
law and morality. He gradually works up to a division of human 
life into that of the outer world or industry, that of the fellow 
world or law, and that of the inner world or morality. This looks 
innocent enough though of course it is nonsense since his parts are 
not mutually exclusive. The outer world includes the fellow world 
and industry is concerned with law on the side of economics at 
least, and industry is one of the main concerns of the fellow world 
through division of labor. But the real vice of his division is the 
assertion that morality concerns solely the inner world. Since, as 
we have shown, moral judgments are the basis of much law, his as-
sumption is contrary to fact. Having laid out this carefully camou-
flaged trench, he borrows the conception that "law is for us the 
order by which the realization of the common will in the mutual 
treatment of the members of the community is intentionally secured 
and guaranteed by coercive measures". Passing by this old Rous-
seau common will, erected by Hegel into a dogma asserting the one 
living organism of the state, here reasserted by Miinsterberg, it is 
plain that his definition wipes out international law. Next he pro-
nounces the theory that law has nothing to do with morality, for 
morality concerns the inner self while law concerns the fellow self. 
The reason that a German makes this assertion is his desire to feed 
the German theory of the state, that the government is not bound 
by the dictates of morality and hence owes no responsibility for 
wanton onslaughts and brutal tyrranies. Volumes have been writ-
ten in Germany to show whether the government can be limited by 
40 Perhaps some may think that Miinsterberg ought to have the benefit of the de 
t11orl11is rule. I cannot think so. I prefer to say with Senator Hoar, when he was 
asked about Wendell Phillips' funeral: "I was not present but I approved of it." 
41 See the Eternal Values, pp. 63, 337, 338. In morality the Germans remind us of 
the old epigram translated in Hamilton's Logic, or was it his Metaphysics? 
"The Germans in Greek 
Are sadly to seek, 
Not five in five score, 
But ninety·five more; 
All save only Herman 
And Herman's a German." 
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its own laws, and the result has been that if it can be so limited, it 
is a case of self-limitation to remain only during its own pleasure. 
This theory, without openly avowing it, was what Miinsterberg had 
in mind to put forth, and his work shows him to be no better th?· 
Demburg whose career is so well known, as a smuggler of ",.1-
fectious stuff". 
This German theory is all verbal fencing.42 The question is as to 
an act. No one but a German "inebriated with the exuberance of 
his own verbosity" could deny that human acts have a moral sig-
nificance and are the subject of moral judgments. The question is 
why some acts which men recognize as wrong and immoral are not 
forbidden by law, while other acts are so forbidden on the ground 
that they are wrong and immoral. The answer is that the distinc-
tion is dictated by the public convenience and the amount of in-
terference with the public welfare. 
But on the other hand, law while going part of the way with 
morality deserts it altogether for other spheres. The rule that a 
deed to a man and his heirs gave a fee simple, while one to the 
man alone gave a life estate, the fee tail created by De Donis, the 
conditional fee before De Donis, never had any meaning for morality. 
The rule that a simple contract without consideration is void, that 
an executory gift is not enforcible, that an instrument under seal 
imports a consideration, that a common recovery with a double 
voucher suffered by the tenant in tail bars not only the fee tail, 
but some other innocent person's remainder in fee or the reversion 
in fee, that a fine by the heir in tail bars the estate tail, but not the 
remainder in fee and creates a base fee which endures as long as 
there is issue of the heir in tail, are all matters outside morality. 
Numberless rules of law can be cited that have no more to do with 
morality than have the matters in the Federal Judicial Code. The 
conclusion is plain. Much law is dictated by the fact that as to 
certain matters there must be some rule, but what rule may be 
adopted is wholly a matter of historical accident. On the other hand, 
when an act immoral in its nature becomes of sufficient importance 
to the public or to other men as to have the attention of public opin-
ion or of the legislative power, it is almost certain to be prohibited 
by law and in just the same way certain acts regarded as morally 
right will be enforced by law, but a man who can say that the human 
"Bentham who can always be relied upon for something untenable has a distinction 
as to justice. Interior justice he says is the conformity of our will to justice, exterior 
justice is the conformity of our action to justice. He believed that the judges made law 
and hence he could have said law may he divided into interior and exterior law. In· 
terior law exists while the judge is thinking about it, exterior law is what he an· 
nounces as his decision. 
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mind when considering the evil consequences of a contemplated act 
is thinking of morality and when thinking of the evil consequences 
toward others of an act actually done is thinking of law, has acheived 
a metaphysical beat that is a physchological impossibility. What he 
has done is to attempt an untenable definition of the moral ideas not 
reconcilable with fact. He asserts that the moral ideas of a certain 
point become legal ideas and are no longer moral. 
In another field we know that the conduct of men is defined by 
law which has its source in prevalent ideas upon economics which 
seem to have a moral aspect. The record of the courts on certain 
matters is a painful subject. For a few years prior to the Jacksonian 
assault on the Second Bank of the United States, we had a cur-
rency that could fairly pretend to decency. 43 The bank prevented 
great issues of worthless paper from western banks by presenting 
the paper for payment. At once arose the howl of "oppression by 
the money power'', the favorite cheap political device of worthless 
demagogues preying on popular ignorance. The western states had 
begun their orgy of great paper banks. The Supreme Court of the 
United States, eminently sane under the leadership of Marshall, in 
Craig v. Missoitri44 held the state paper illegal and void, but by a 
close decision of four judges to three dissenting political judges. 
Then came on the case of Briscoe v. Bank, which was the same 
point in effect, but the court was lacking two judges and divided 
three to two, Marshall and Story and Baldwin holding the bank's 
notes illegal, but no opinion was announced since four judges were 
not concurring.45 The case was continued over two -terms.46 Then 
Marshall and another judge passed away and Jackson packed the 
court with his wretched partisans.47 The court now steadily de-
teriorated into stump speech decisions until it went to pieces over 
the Dred Scott case. The mistaken decision legalized "wild-cat" 
banking. The government could put no money in the state banks for 
it was all stolen owing to the fact that politicians would not patmnize 
solvent eastern banks. This brought on the curse of Van Buren's 
scheme of an independent treasury carried through under the pitiful 
Tyler. At last came on the civil war. The government needed 
money and the solvent northern bankers, like the patriots they 
"See The Second Bank of the United States by Catteral, a valuable book never dis-
covered by such writers as Conant. 
.. 4 Pet. 410. Read in the original report the superlatively absurd argument of 
Thomas H. Benton, our old demos-krateo friend. 
••See dissenting opinion of Judge Story, II Pet. 328. 
'"Briscoe v. Bank, 8 Pet. n8; same case 9 Pet. 85; same case II Pet. 257. 
41 See Sumner's Life of Jackson, p. 360. Of the seven Jackson had now appointed, 
five, Taney, C. J., and McLean, Baldwin, Wayne and Barbour. One good judge, Baldwin, 
out of five was a high average for Jackson. 
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were,48 agreed to loan the government one hundred and fifty mil-
lions. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, with ineffable stupidity 
insisted on the money being paid in specie into the independent treas-
ury. There it was locked up in spite of the representations of tr. . 
bankers that such conduct would take away the metallic basis ~or 
the circulation and cause every solvent bank to suspend specie pay-
ments. 49 Chase persisted and by his financial crassness broke every 
bank in the United States. Then he invented his criminal green-
backs, and in violation of all sound finance made them a legal 
tender. They started on the downward grade while Chase kept 
printing more currency to accelerate the process. Then he be-
came Chief Justice and, still hoping to be President, held his legal 
tenders. unconstitutional.50 The court reinforced overruled the 
decision, 51 Chase and the Democratic hard-shells wailing in dis-
sent, and thus we had the double curse of greenbacks and independ-
ent treasury. All these varied evils which cost the people of the 
United States untold wealth and our currency evils to the present 
day would never have happened except for the "hayseed" finance 
in one absurd opinion. It is needless to say anything about the 
Sherman law since it appears to be repealed by "unanimous con-
sent", after running the usual course of ponderous and irrecon-
cilable error; or rather, it has been found to be the ill-conditioned 
dog which sinks his teeth into the calf of the best friend of the 
family. 
But happily for the law the difficult questions for law in economics 
do not appeal to the moral instincts. They are more or less conflicts 
between classes and there are so many classes that no particular 
class,. except in moments of extreme governmental supineness or 
cowardice, will have very much of its own way. The political ap-
peal to one particular class stirs resentment among other classes. 
As we proceed through other fields of law we find that while almost 
all the law of torts and practically all the penal law has a moral 
sanction; when the field of public law and the influence of the science 
of government is reached, we are no longer dealing with morality,52 
except when equality presents that aspect. When we pass to the 
""Nothing in our political history is more disgusting than the usual abuse of bank· 
ers, yet when the country is in difficulties they always respond as they are now re-
sponding. They are the one class who can claim "hands that never failed their country". 
••See McCall, Life of Stevens, pp. 154-157. It is rather a pity that Samuel W. 
McCall has been lost to Congress . 
.. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. 
11 See Legal Tender Cases, 12 Whll. 457. 
112 Th~ whole remedial part of the law is properly a part of the public law. Even 
Baron Parke, old Surrebutter himself, could not get up any moral enthusiasm over the 
science of special pleading or that tort feasor of wide machinations, the casual ejector. 
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sphere of international law we are again in the field of rules, many 
of which depend solely on the abstract idea of justice. Among 
civilized men whose moral instincts have not been blunted by the 
training of perverts, public international opinion is much the same 
as the public opinion of a particular state. Considering the Rus-
sian as denied as to the great mass of his population a place among 
civilized peoples, or at any rate any but a low place, the Swedes are 
the only civilized race which seems impervious to international 
moral ideas. What Professor Kohler called "the great Islamic 
culture" does not, of-course, belong among civilized nations. 
To conclude this view of the part of human conduct dominated 
by law, we are able to say generally that the idea of justice domi-
nates the greater part of the law, or at least the idea of what was 
once supposed to be justice, and hence law is in this sense natural. 
But the enthusiastic description of Cicero, that "law is the distinction 
between things just and unjust, a distinction that has its source in 
that eldest and first nature of all things to which the laws of men 
are all directed, which represses evil men by penalties and defends 
and protects the good", is as to existing law but the mystical ex-
pression of "the soul of the wide world dreaming on things to come". 
Law we must all sadly acknowledge is full of "defects, redundancies 
and errors", but those things come mainly from the fact that law 
must be a system administered by the weak and infirm minds of 
human beings, and almost all its defects arise from a praiseworthy 
attempt to make it "fool-proof" against judges. On the one hand 
is the individual's forgetting that justice demands as the rule of 
equality a general rule applicable to all, and on the other hand, 
the lawyers and the best judges perfectly persuaded that unless 
general rules are preserved there is no law. Above it all is the basic 
'10tion of justice demanding general rules. 
There is no criterion by which the domain of human acts governed 
by law can be separated from other human conduct. Morality is 
no criterion, justice is no sufficient guide, hurtfulness of the act to 
society and to others is too indefinite for use, the tendency to pro-
mote the public welfare is simply a rule of public policy which is 
as changeable as the chameleon. All these matters have an influ-
ence, but they do not define the limits of law. Can we even say 
that law is concerned solely with human conduct toward other 
human beings? The laws against cruelty to animals, the law by 
which a trust for animals may be enforced, the cases of theft where 
no one's property rights can be ascertained to be affected, the laws 
against attempts at suicide, are only seeming exceptions. We may 
say that law is a collection of rules which govern men in their rela-
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tions with other men, that an illegal act must be one which con-
cerns more persons than the doer of the act, or, to use the phrase of 
Miinsterberg which is very happy when applied Teutonically, "the 
fellow world". The farthest, however, we can go is to say t}y ~ 
the largest part of human conduct toward other men is not the sub-
ject of law, that not all of right or wrong, just or unjust conduct 
toward others, is the subject of law, that of the part of human con-
duct which is enjoined by law some of it has a moral significance, 
some an economical significance and some a purely governmental 
significance, but all of law, even its omissions, has in some view 
of it a supposed benefit or advantage to the social welfare and hence 
a sociological significance. 
IV. 
THE !,AW HISTORICAI,I,Y CONSIDERED. 
The general facts of legal development are an essential part of 
civilization. The progress from the miserable cowering savage 
through his invention of the bow and arrow, assuring him food; 
through the finding of fire, stolen the Greeks said from Heaven; 
through some sort of pottery, assuring the means of cooking food; 
through the domestication of animals, assuring flocks and herds, 
to the nomad state, while the objects of property kept widening 
as men had use for different kinds of property, gave man a cer-
tainty of means of regular living. Next he found that he could 
cultivate plants and thus come together with his "fellow world" 
in larger communities. Houses and lands now became property, 
and barter grew as an iricipient division of labor. The working of 
the metals and improving weapons made men prepared to enslave 
their fellow men by war. The tribe kept widening and chiefs and 
sub-chiefs gaining in power. At last the discovery of the precious 
metals gave scope for a widening commerce and a larger division 
of labor.53 
Generalizations upon the form of developing social organization 
have been attempted. It is said that the order is a progression from 
the tribe founded on marriage and blood relationship to the terri-
.. There has been a great struggle over whether law as the product of man's will 
can be considered a cause, or whether the mechanical theorists are correct in denying 
causal significance to all human acts. Jhering's Purpose in Law conceives law as con· 
scious purpose, therefore as a means by which men consciously strive for ends. The 
thought is a mere commonplace. The ordinary belief of men has been so, and history 
while it shows men in tbe grasp of destiny, yet tends to show that with advancing civil· 
ization men gain greater power over nature. But men gain at the same time greater 
social adjustment. 
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torial organization founded on occupation of the land, to the 
seigniorial organization founded upon the relatio~ between lord 
and dependents, to the social organization based on intercourse and 
contractual relations between individuals. Similarly the family or-
ganization is said to have progressed from the matriarchy, or rela-
tionship through the mother alone, through patriarchy as in the 
Roman patria potestas, to the modern bilateral family. But in this 
field almost any assertion may be supported by some sort of gauzy 
proof and the matter is all speculative. 
But the fixed fact is that out of the barbarous stage men emerged 
with a mass of customs, far more binding and inexorable than our 
laws, but certainly deserving the name of law because they were 
rules of human conduct governing men in their relations with their 
fellow men and universally observed. This body of customs was 
homogenous in the sense that religious, tribal, trading, pastoral and 
legal customs were all binding alike. Gradually as combinations 
of villages and cities and tribes gained a social feeling, states de-
veloped. Along the Nile, eternally enriched and fertilized, a district 
developed a powerful government. In the rich lands on the Euphrates 
and the 'l'igris grew another social aggregate, or rather two, that 
were to contest the world with the Egyptian. On the eastern shore 
of the Mediterranean and on the islands grew a great commerce 
and the accumulated wealth of Tyre, and Sidon and Crete. The 
Grecian hive swarmed to the mainland of Asia. Those great tradern 
filled the harbors of the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. In the 
.neantime a sturdy collection of villages was beginning its career 
on the banks of the Tiber. 
In the world today we can find every stage of this growth. The 
Australian still uses a club for his favorite weapon. The Indian 
until lately used the spear and bow and arrow. The nomads still 
roam in the uplands of Asia. The village community with its com-
mon lands is found all over the world. The single tribe without 
a chief is not unknown. The powerful collection of tribes has been 
studied as it exists in Africa and as it existed in North America. 
From the Andaman Islander who catches fish with his hands to our 
high civilization, the phenomena are basically the same. The method 
of increasing social aggregates is also the same. Through it all men 
are governed by customarily accepted rules which are laws for 
human conduct. The system of law is none the less law among 
those who have no judicial tribunals than among those who have 
our elaborate forms for litigation. Law, the fact, the thing itself, 
is wholly independent of any judicial tribunal, and if we make a 
definition of law we must regard the judicial tribunal as a mere ac-
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cident. But what is the common feature of all these various systems? 
Is it not that the body of customary conduct was accepted by in-
dividuals and that men found that the social well being could prevail 
only if the rule for all men was enforced by _public opinion? LiV' , 
speaking of the earliest days of Rome, has a remarkable statemeut: 
"The laws are a deaf and inexorable thing, safer and better for the 
weak, than for the powerful ; they have no relaxation nor indulg-
ence, if their bounds are exceeded; for it would be a perilous thing 
in the midst of so many human errors to try to live by innocence 
alone".54 This statement when analyzed gives the same reason for 
law that the sciences give; it is the zeal for equality, the desire to 
make all things equal and the rules of conduct equally binding. 
Even a_ German may be quoted for this. Schiller says : 
The law is the friend of the weak. 
It strives to make all equaP5 
But comparative law gives us further light. We go back to the 
stage of no judicial tribunals and the sanction of law is self-help. 
The sufferer himself exacted the penalty for a breach of his cus-
tomary right. When this condition existed, the law itself meas-
ured the reparation for an injury upon the principle of equality, and 
the only measure it could give to self-help was an exact equivalent, 
an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, ox for ox, sheep for sheep. 
This is the rule of equality and a very reasonable_ rule for the con-
dition. Compensatory damages, reparation of the loss is still our 
guiding principle. In the primitive days, the custom gave the judg-
ment, the injured individual carried his own warrant or execution, 
but like the sheriff today, he took the chance of finding no one at 
home, or of no property to take. But public opinion was the only 
posse comitatus. 
Society found, however, this process of self-help, and conse-
quent fighting and private war, too costly. Men were ready to pay 
for their mistakes and the more peacefully inclined were ready to 
take the recompense. Now by the same slow agency of custom 
grew up the customary tariff. So much was due for a hand, so 
much for an arm, so much for a life, so much for a daughter's 
chastity, so much for a wife's unfaithfulness. But how can any 
man say that this is not law, just as much as our law laid down by 
judicial tribunals. In fact, we can prove it law today. If under 
.. Livy ii, 3. 
65 "Das Gesetz ist der Freund der Schwachen 
Es will alle nur eben machen.'' 
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our law the husband find the adulterer defiling his wife, he may 
kill him. This is the pure law of self-help. The householder may 
kill the burglar, the cowboy may kill the "rustler'' who is making 
off with the cattle. In a hundred different ways we apply the law 
of self-help and we do it without the aid of any judicial tribunal, 
simply by the power of customary public opinion called law. We 
too have our tariff for a foot, a leg, an arm, an eye or a life. What 
is our law as to personal injuries in dangerous or hazardous occupa-
tions? It is merely an accident that it is a statute. Public opinion 
made the law, perhaps very unwisely, for it is a recurrence to a 
barbarous stage, and such atavism is always unsafe. And what is 
the reason for the law? The same old reason of law striving to 
make all things equal. What now becomes of the theory of law 
that it contains the element of a coercion by the public authority? 
What becomes of the theory of law that it is made by a judicial trib-
unal? Here is law that carries no public coercion, law that never 
heard of a judicial tribunal. The comer's verdict, the ignoramus of 
a grand jury, the discharge of a magistrate, the settlement of the 
.damages, are all the mere accidental trimmings of a higher civiliza-
tion. We can emphatically say then that public coercion and a 
judicial tribunal are not historically a part of the notion of law. 
In course of time certain acts. become public offences and these 
were at first the more dangerous crimes. A judicial tribunal of some 
sort was rendered necessary. In some tribes it was probably the 
whole body of the tribe. As the chief gained in power, such mat-
ters were offences against him as the public authority. As society 
grew in complexity, the laws and customs grew and were reiterated 
by individual cases. The elder men or the priests, as among the 
Celts, passed on the questions and awarded the compensation or 
penalty. But in many cases proof was needed. The oath was a 
defence and then the oath with oath helpers. Other methods of 
proof, such as the ordeal of battle, were developed. Perhaps it is 
safer to call the trial by battle a regulated private war. But it was 
all customary and rigid and formal. Perhaps the next stage was 
that laws and customs were written down or engraved on stone. 
Just as Justinian's compilers headed by Tribonian went through 
the legal writings and made up the Digest, so Khammurabi, ages 
before, wrote down the customs and the tariffs, and they were 
found in great part when the great library was unearthed/5" along 
with multitudes of court decisions. The same thing is true of the 
Lex Salica, or the Breviary of Alaric 01: the first Visigothic code, 
... The diorite stone belongs to a much later time. 
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or the laws of the Anglo-Saxon kings. But man is an imitative ani-
mal. He hears of other and better laws. He calls upon Solon or 
Lycurgus to improve his customs, or Rome sends her decemvirs to 
consult the Greeks, and much of the result is incorporated in t1 t 
Twelve Tables. But the Greeks made a lamentable failure, for tney 
never developed a competent tribunal. 
Two races in this long history showed a great genius for law, 
the Roman and the Norman, but the Roman long preceded the 
Norman, and in many ways helped to make the Norman law in 
England. Their legal history presents a curious parallel and no 
less interesting divergencies. At Rome a body of customs grew up 
among a certain aggregation of village communities. They de-
velopeq the private ownership of land and personal property. But 
the situation was complicated by the presence of two classes, the 
original Romans called patricians and the descendants of the sub-
jugated, or plebeians. Gradually a law of contract was developed, 
first religiously enforced as a matter of good faith.' The right to 
seize the person of the debtor and enslave him was recognized. 
Private vengeance for a death was exacted, and theft and robbery 
were originally private wrongs ·often compounded for money, but 
there was a gradually developing distinction between crime and 
private wrong. Gradually, too, the mass of the people gained a 
part in the government, and in the making of laws. They had a 
palladium of liberty (unicum praesidium libertatis) which was that 
no Roman citizen should be deprived of life, liberty or citizenship 
without an appeal to the popular assembly ( comitia centuriata not 
concilium plebis). At last a commission was sent to Athens to study 
the laws of Solon and a code of part of the law was made in the form 
of the Twelve Tables. Now the law was ready to develop a legal 
profession. As soon as law reaches the stage where it cannot be 
generally known, a legal profession is a necessity. The practice was 
first in the hands of the priests, then in those of the laity. A stereo-
typed procedure and then the legis actiones no less formal governed 
the substantive law. 
The body of law that grew up called the jus civile, was the par-
ticular law for the full Roman citizens, but all sorts and conditions 
of men crowded to Rome. They were not entitled to the jus civile 
but they had their own controversies either among themselves or 
with Romans, which must be governed by some law. They were of 
different races, and what more appropriate than to apply to them 
the principles of law accepted everywhere and considered to be 
proper because comformable to natural justice. This jits naturale 
or jus gentium was potentially applicable among all people at all 
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times and corresponded with innate conceptions of right and justice. 
It was in fact a rationalizing process applied to the law and showed 
the growing power of substance over form. Another term for it 
was the jus honorariztm or the officials' law, and it became highly 
developed by the responses of the jurisconsults to particular cases. 
It gra~ually overcame and substituted itself for the jus civile. From 
this source was made up the final collection of Justinian. 
If this commonly received account of the Roman law is true, 
and in its main outline it cannot be denied, it 'vould follow that 
the Roman jits gentiitm or natural law was a system of positive law, 
and that the legislation of the praetors embodied in the Perpetual 
Edict, improved upon by the jurisconsults, is the greatest standing 
argument for the advocates of the natural law school. 
The growth of English law began with a ruling class of Nor-
mans who governed a much larger class of Anglo-Saxons and per-
haps older races of servile condition.56 The Normans found among 
the English a crude system of composition for injury and crime and 
a set of popular tribunals. At first there was a sort of personal law 
for Normans and another for Saxons, but this did not long survive. 
If we could know with preciseness the situation in the hundred 
years from 1066 to n66, the crucial period, much doubt would be 
removed.57 
The law at first was one of forms and writs. The writs were 
developed on Roman models by the clerics among the Normans. 
We know the law just as it is developing a learned profession. Sit-
ting in the courts were generally priests as judges, and all they 
knew was the highly Romanized canon law. The king's judges 
presided over the county courts when they went to take the assizes. 
They were compelled to apply a vast mass of customary law, but 
they soon wiped out in their tribunals the old composition system of 
the Anglo-Saxons and practically all of the Anglo-Saxon law.58 At 
first all wrongs and crimes were private injuries, and the one who 
sought justice brought an appeal where either wager of battle or 
'" For the continuance of Roman Law see Roman Law in the Modern World, a most 
interesting and valuable book. It is by Charles Sherman and published by the Boston 
Book Co. 
or I have never doubted that the basis of the English population was Briton and not 
Anglo-Saxon. The persistence of the Anglo-Saxon myth is to me inexplicable • 
.. It cannot be too strongly insisted that English law is Norman and not Anglo-
Saxon. I remember that Dean Pound somewhere quoting from Freeman, the English 
historian, the most noted of the Anglo·Saxon myth-makers, cites the examiner in law 
who insisted that William the Conqueror introduced the feudal system at the gemote at 
Salisbury in 1086, and strongly insinuates that it was an ass speaking. He should have 
recalled the historic instance of the ass that spake, and this is the only one on record; 
and when Balaam belabored him, it turned out that the ass v/as right and Balaam the 
wise man was wrong. 
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wager of law by oath and oath helpers was used. The Norman, 
however, soon developed a better style of tribunal, and got rid of 
the hap-hazard popular tribunals of the Anglo-Saxons. He had the 
genius to keep the popular element, but under control. Twelve mer 
were sworn to inform the court upon oath as to the fact. Thc...,e 
sworn witnesses soon usurped all other forms of trial through 
the judicial device of turning the assize into a jury. This is the 
unique development of the English law which had its errors as well 
as its benefits. But gradually the form of trial by jury witnesses 
reduced the tribunals to certain civil remedies, either the giving 
of a money judgment for damages for breach of a written contract 
or for a wrong to person or property, or an adjudication of the 
owners'tiip or possession of real or personal property. This left a 
large gap of jurisdiction which the clerical chancellors under the 
rules of equity absorbed. Developing commerce brought the simple 
contract more and more into use. The common law courts could 
not enforce such a contract because they saw that a private contract 
could not be witnessed to by the sworn twelve who could swear 
only as to matters of public knowledge. Hence those courts were 
compelled in the case of unwritten contracts to retain the old wager 
of law whereby any debtor with six rascals could swear an honest 
man out of his goods, as Lord Chief Justice BEREFORD tells us in 
the Year Book. The Chancellors quickly took jurisdiction over these 
matters of simple contract and enforced them until the common law 
courts restored their jurisdiction by the growing practice of the 
jury hearing the evidence of witnesses and by the invention of the 
action of assumpsit to which wager of law was not pleadable. 
The chancery system of equity and the system of common law, 
after violent quarrels, settled down to a situation of peace; and 
equity in its tum hardened into a body of well defined rules and 
a strict division was maintained until in the progress of time the 
two systems became amalgamated except as to the jury trial, which 
compels the distinction to remain. 
It appears that in many ways the developments of Roman and 
of English law were analogous. Both started with customs and built 
upon them. Both had a system of rigid formulary law which grad-
ually yielded to the rationalizing process. As the jus civile yielded 
to the jus gentium so the common law gradually yielded to the sys-
tem of equity. The process in either case lasted over four hun-
dred years. Both systems at the stage where rationalizing began 
developed a powerful_ legal profession. The English process was 
the work of trained lawyers just as the Roman process was the work 
of jurisconsults. But Rome with her great legal and political capacity 
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developed merely a powerful form of administration while England 
and her lawyers developed political liberty. 
Other nations have not been so fortunate. France was ruled for 
centuries by a system of personal law where the members of each 
race had their particular kind of law. This gradually yielded to a 
system of local customs over which the Roman law presided as the 
custom of the written law or common law. Out of this mass of 
laws through a powerful legal profession France developed by a 
succession of codes culm~nating in the Code Napoleon, a general 
national law, which merely established for the whole country one 
set of theretofore prevailing customs. 
Germany on the other hand never had a powerful legal profession, 
and there was no class to relegate to a proper field the professors. 
There the lawyer was always held in contempt. The different dis-
tricts lived first under personal law then under local customs until 
at last came the reception of the Roman law which was called the 
:ommon law. It attempted with varying success to supplant the 
various local customs until at last the law, after various partial at-
:empts, was codified in the Civil Code which is mainly Roman Law 
:md the work of law professors, not practical men. It has been 
!Xtravagantly praised but is already showing the usual defects of 
!very code. 
Generally speaking, therefore, two races developed enduring sys-
:ems of law by their own exertions. In other countries the final law 
was more or less the result of imitation; in either case the law as it 
:ook enduring shape was the work of lawyers working either on 
:he basis of custom or on the Roman law. The net result viewed 
Erom a historical standpoint is that the law as developed among 
:ivilized nations is very little of it the work of legislation. 
The poets have attempted to tell us of this history. Lowell's 
.ines are precisely true of the law: 
"On the rock primeval hidden in the past its bases be 
Block by block the endeavoring ages built it up to what we see." 
A remarkable instance of legal development under custom has 
:aken place in the memory of men now living. After the placers, 
:he products of erosion, had been worked in our California mining 
:ountry, gold and silver and other metals were found in the Sierras 
~xisting in veins called lodes. There was no law to govern the 
niners in regard to lodes which were deposits of ore in place, not in 
letrit1ts, unless they made one themselves. The rule was estab-
ished after an old English mining custom, by which the miner never 
~oing beyond his length of vein could follow the vein anywhere 
m its descent. This seemed to the miners eminently just and ap-
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plicable to any sort of veins. At last this custom in 1866 was at-
tempted to be put into a few sections of ·a statute. But although 
it was well known then that there were many kinds of ore deposits 
that were not regular, the presiding Rhadamanthus, a strange ol • 
Santa Claus named Stewart, could think only 0£ regular narruw 
fissure veins. The law would have been excellent had not nature 
proved so erratic. 
Then came a development of the mining law which has been 
claimed to be peculiarly an instance of courts making law, but the 
facts are otherwise. The custom was not as narrow as the statute. 
The custom was independent of ·the form of veins; it said that 
the discoverer took the length of vein he marked off on the surface 
with copvenient surface ground also marked off, and that everything 
in the ground belonged to the owner except a vein that had an 
apex or outcrop in some other person's ground. Veins were now 
discovered which were not fissures but contacts of different forma-
tions. One side of the contact was often soft rock and large ore 
bodies had made off into the soft rock. Stewart's law was wholly 
astray but the courts followed the custom refraining from making 
any law of their own. Soon it turned out that some veins were in 
fact zones of impregnation with bunches or bodies of ore anywhere 
in the zone. The courts followed the custom and gave to the miner 
the zone as a vein between the end lines. This actually governed the 
case where the miner not knowing how wide the vein was had placed 
his side line cutting the vein lengthwise, leaving part of the outcrop 
on its strike outside the claim. The whole vein for the length 
located went to the discoverer under the custom. In the meantime 
it was found that the discoverer not knowing how the vein ran 
placed his claim across the vein. Still following the custom the 
courts gave the length of the vein covered and side lines became end 
lines. Again the outcrop crossed an end line and a side line, still 
the custom as to length of vein was followed. But now came the 
cases where great bodies of ore lay in the ground without any out-
crop. Here the other part of the custom was followed and the 
ore went to the owner of the surface unless some one else could 
prove the apex. In some cases hundreds of thousands of dollars 
were spent in cutting down or up through solid country rock, work-
ing out immense chambers, as if full of ore, with a ·full connecting 
line of raises and winzes and levels, and in supplementing this dis-
honest work by colossal perjury to show an apex. One shudders to 
think how the facts were settled in important mining cases. I know 
of a case where the Supreme Court could not see that it was lend-
ing its authority to a holding that the descent of a vein into the earth 
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was its length along a level run lengthwise in the vein. But out of 
it all emerged the triumphant custom that the discoverer obtained 
his length of vein and everything under his surface ground not 
shown to apex in some other miner's claim. At length came the case 
of two parallel veins of which different lengths were covered by 
the claim. Here the court like the chameleon "attempting to make 
good" on a Scotch plaid, went to pieces. No one in the court seemed 
to understand the case and the court asserted that it had decided 
the exact opposite of that which it did decide. The court left us as 
the heirs of an insoluble mystery/9 but no one could claim that the 
court made any rule of law. The law of water appropriation and 
irrigation in the arid part of our country is an even better in-
stance of custom. 
Historically, therefore, law is custom, and rigid and unvarying 
custom applying without exception a general rule. The idea that in 
oriental justice the will of the judge takes the place of law by rule, 
or that law has progressed from uncertainty to certainty is a total 
error. The law progresses by a rationalizing process which sub-
stitutes a lesser certainty for a greater. No less erroneous is the 
idea that a rule of law is not logically essential to the administra- • 
tion of justice.60 It has been shown above that by the constitution 
of the human mind a general rule is essential to the concept of 
justice. When a legislative power is developed it by statute imposes 
certain rules of law. The ancient division of lex scripta and lex 
non scripta holds good. There is no other source of law and Bracton 
was strictly correct when he called his treatise on law De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae. There is another professorial and pedantic 
use of the word sources meaning the places where is sought informa-
tion as to what the law is or was. In this sense constitutions, 
statutes, treaties, judicial decisions, legal writings may all be used 
to ascertain the fact, but the proper use of the word source is in 
a causal sense, what causes the law to exist, and to this question 
there can be but one answer, custom shown by general consent 
and legislation. These are the proximate causes and they are both 
one, for no statute is a statute unless obeyed generally as a statute. 
If remote causes are sought and in jure proxima sed non remota 
causa spectatitr, the answer must be the general sense of justice and 
general notions of public convenience or welfare. For interna-
tional law the same statements hold good, except that there is no 
69 Walrath v. Champion Mining Company, 171 U. S. 293. 
"" See 13 Columbia Law Rev. 696. For the most preposterous statement in this article 
as to the law, a story by Kipling is cited. 
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legislation and in some cases custom and the rules resulting from 
general justice become embodied in agreements between nations. 
In this description of legal development most thinking men will 
miss any reference to the influence of religion upon legal concer 
tions. It is no doubt true that religion with its great emotim,al 
appeal has done probably more than all other influences to mould 
the human race to the reign of law. It is with good reason that 
the priest and the clergyman are said to be in alliance with the 
lawyer. From the priest the lawyer both in Rome and England and 
in other systems received the torch of legal enlightenment, and 
when the torch was handed to the lawyer the priest still kept the 
sacred fire burning on his altar. The moral law embodied in the 
ten co1!llllandments has done more for the law of humanity in 
Christian lands than all the statutes.61 The ordinary man long 
after he has ceased to feel an active interest in religion and is a 
parcus deoritm cultor et infreq1tens unconsciously acts from his long 
inherited training in the commandments. For millions those sol-
emn words still fall upon the ear as the Divine law. The lovely. 
ideal of faith, joy, hope, goodness, charity, mildness and self-con-
trol of the Savior's life upon earth is yet the most powerful emotion 
to lead men to the virtues that make the gracious, kindly and law 
abiding soul. Neither atheist nor socialist can ever still "the Voice 
that breathed o'er Eden the primal marriage blessing". Millions of 
men are gladly offering their lives for Christ's ideal of the oneness 
of suffering humanity and in obedience to the moral law. Nowhere 
has the essential alliance of law and religion been better expressed 
than in the words of Bracton, himself a priest and our first great 
legal author: Jus dicit1tr ars boni et aequi cuj1ts merito quis nos 
sacerdotes appellat; jttStitiam namque colimus et sacra jura min-
istramus. "Law is called the science of the right and just whose 
priests some one has said we are; for justice is our religion and we 
minister its holy rites." 
v. 
ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LAW. 
It is not necessary here to enter upon the controversy of a proper 
classification of the law. The subject has its difficulties but they 
are mainly difficulties of convenience of treatment. The point for 
our present purpo_se is to state the comparative rules of law as 
they exist among civilized peoples. If law is in general among all 
01 It is peculiarly appropriate that Neitzsche in his Also sprach Zarathrustra should 
say to the Germans: " 'Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal.' These words were once 
called holy; before them men bared the head and bent the knee. * • • Oh, my brothers 
I beseech you to break the old tables." Kohler is a profound admirer of Nietzsche. 
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civilized nations controlled by the same physical facts, the same 
facts of mental constitution, the same general conceptions of justice 
and morality, we may expect to find a general correspondence in the 
rules of law and the various subjects to which it is applied, varied 
by influences of race and comparative advancement. The differ-
ences in details are not of importance for our present purpose. 
The necessary division of the science of existing law would seem 
to be into that part of law which governs the relations of citizens 
among themselves and that part which governs the relation of citi-
zens to their government; the one part called private law, the other 
called public law. The division called public international law has 
a separate place. That there is such a law as the latter as a fact 
is proven by its use and application in the courts. Private inter-
national law belongs under the head of private law. 
The law that involves the person and the duties which each per-
son may claim as owed to him or her as a member of the social or-
ganization, resulting as such law must result from fixed physical 
and social facts will be found to be practically the same in every 
civilized society. Personal security will be everywhere protected, 
but in certain countries arrests and improper imprisonments are 
considered as not being private wrongs. The general disabilities 
due to infancy, coverture, lack of mental ability, are in general ef-
fect the same. Even personal privacy and the duty to respect it 
will be recognized except where the curiosity of the prying vulgar 
or the low level of the newspaper will introduce variations. Reputa-
tion and social acceptability and occupational, professional or busi-
ness standing will be protected from unjust attack. The variations 
among different countries are of little importance and often wholly 
accidental due to particular conditions. The method of forming 
artificial persons and their powers and duties, and the relations of 
the artificial persons to their constituent members and the members' 
relations to each other, partly belong to the law of personality and 
partly to the law of obligations, but they have in all countries a 
complete general identity. 
The regulation of family relations, marriage and its incidents, the 
duration of the marriage and the property relations of the spouses, 
the dissolution of the marriage and the results of dissolution, the 
laws regulating the relations of parent and child, and the artificial 
substituted relations, like guardian and ward, the succession to the 
family property in cases of intestacy, the devolution of property 
by will, are all a part of every system of civilized law. The local 
variations are due either to current religious conceptions or to social 
development. 
332 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
The laws as to the possession and ownership of property, its 
acquisition and transfer for both real and personal property, are 
practically the same in general features. Even such property as 
patents, trade marks, trade names, shows a development very mu,..· 1 
the same. In English law the differences between real and personal 
property, the peculiar law of estates in real property is but a local 
variation due to certain facts of historical development. Equitable 
ownership shows some peculiarities in different countries owing to 
the same reason. The law of obligations varies somewhat with the 
effectiveness of division of labor. 
Private international law which is ordinarily called the conflict 
of laws presents an insoluble problem to those who think that law 
is made. by judicial decision. The substantially similar results reached 
by courts in different countries are an encouraging phenomenon for 
those who look for an ever growing and ever more universally re-
spected international law. Practically the whole field of private in-
ternational law is the development of purely rational principles pro-
ceeding from the dominant sense of justice among civilized men 
in the Roman law co-ordinated with the thought that each nation 
should be at liberty to form its own law within its own dominions. 
The part of criminal law that belongs to private international law 
causes a formal difficulty, but more formal than real, in the classi-
fication of criminal law as a part of the public law. 
Penal law concerns that part of jurisprudence which defines crim-
inal offences. Criminal offences are considered as breaches of the 
public order, and therefore they define relations between the gov-
ernment and its citizens. But however penal law is placed in a 
legal classification, it is apparent that in most civilized countries 
crimes are substantially the same. The great number of crimes 
existed long before legislation. The ordinary penal code is merely 
a transcript of the customary list and definitions of public offences. 
Legislation has added some crimes and abolished others, but the 
decisive and controlling features remain the same in different coun-
tries. In point of punishment for crimes the general sense of 
civilized communities shows a prevailing uniformity. Volumes, 
however, have been written to justify the imposition of punishment. 
It has been said that it is due to a feeling of revenge, but as has 
been shown above, it is really due to the sense of justice, to the 
basic idea of equality. The conception that punishment is due to 
revenge has done much to obscure the true end of penal law. The 
theories are that the punishment is imposed for revenge, and there-
fore it is improper, that it is imposed for public example and 
therefore where no public example is to be served, no punishment 
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should be imposed, and that it is imposed for the reformation of 
the criminal, and hence in the case of an incorrigible, he either ought 
not to be punished at all or should be perpetually imprisoned or 
put to death. All these theories have no basis in either psychology 
or sociology. Criminals are punished for public offences because 
it is for the good of society that their punishment should not be left 
to individuals as formerly it was. Offences against the whole 
society, such as treason, are necessarily punished by the state. The 
reason why men should be punished for crime is because the normal 
human social mind is not like a maudlin penologist's or a nerve-
less theorist's. The individual has the sense of equality and to him 
it is plain that every offence of one man against another lowers 
that other and the balance can be restored only by a punishment 
proportioned to the offence. But as men have rationalized the law 
they have found that the same offence greatly varies in moral guilt. 
When depraved wretches steal a little child and hold it for ransom 
and kill it to avoid detection or because the ransom is not paid, 
every normal human being wishes them hanged. On the other 
hand when a man under strong provocation kills another, there is a 
different suggestion. The law attempts to rectify these matters by 
means of degrees of crime and latitude in punishment. Sometimes, 
as in the case of the woman who killed her husband for grounds 
the law could not accept as sufficient justification under a general 
rule, she was not thought at all culpable, and her acquittal of any 
crime is smothered under the verdict of a jury. But the crimin-
ologists deny moral responsibility for crime. They generally accept 
the mechanical theory that human purpose, motive and intention, 
cannot be the cause of anything since they are caused by invariable 
factors, for which the man himself is not responsible. This is the 
old dispute as to free will now given a mechanical instead of a 
theological aspect. The answer to it is that every human being 
feels that he can choose his course and act upon his choice, and 
the feeling of remorse proves this consciousness. It seems useless 
to speculate upon a mere theory which ail normal human minds 
reject, unless they happen to be criminal. But it is also true that 
the free will of the best mind would be one that would instinctively 
choose the good instead of an evil course. But for the purposes 
of punishment and of society, all people must be assumed to be 
responsible for their conduct, unless under disability of some kind. 
Punishment becomes then a purely relative thing. But there is 
more nonsense talked about reforming criminals than about any 
other subject in the law. Probably the effect of punishment for 
public example is grossly exaggerated, and if it is of any importance 
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then the death penalty for most important offences is the proper 
solution. But the point here is that crime and punishment have 
little to do with any part of the law except the basic notion of 
justice. 
When we turn to other fields of public law we find a greater 
diversity. Every civilized government has assumed the double 
duty of doing justice between its citizens and between itself and its 
citizens. For this purpose there has been established an elaborate 
system of courts and of remedies for the exercise of what is called 
the judicial power. As between citizens it is recognized everywhere 
that the judicial power must be absolutely independent of control 
or there can be no general rule applied or impartiality maintained, 
which a,re both necessary to justice. These remedial forms are of 
a general similarity. A notice to the opposite party of a claim made 
against him, an opportunity to be heard, proceedings in his pres-
ence or in the presence of his counsel and an impartial judgment are 
deemed necessary. The greatest diversity exists as to the method 
of ascertaining contested facts, and it is in regard to these matters 
that the imperfect human element is most in evidence. Next comes 
the ascertainment of the rule of law applicable, which may be a 
rule of law of the particular country or sometimes that of some 
other country. Here the imperfect human element is just as much 
in evidence. The judgment and its execution are analogous under 
most systems. The peculiar English and Anglo-American institu-
tion of the jury adopted in many countries and the rules of evidence 
nowhere adopted need not detain us. 
For correcting errors of courts appellate courts exist, but in Ger-
many their function is merely ornamental since the lower court 
is not bound by the decisions of the appellate court. 
But in deciding controversies between the state and its citizens 
the question is at once raised whether the state is bound by its 
own laws.62 Under the German conception where the government 
"'There is a growing jurisdiction in England which may well be copied among us 
which shows the binding force of law. It would be a simian act more intelligent than 
some of our efforts. M. Tarde would say that practically all general improvement in 
law comes from imitation. The jurisdiction and procedure to be copied is that of 
declaratory judgments where men can go to court and find before the difficulty happens 
what their rights are. This shows that courts cannot and do not make law, for the as· 
sumption is that a rule of law exists which will apply to the controversy when it arises. 
And this obviates a great difficulty in the law. Law does not prevent anything except 
in the rare cases where preventive action can be obtained. It leaves men free to violate 
the law simply telling them they must either make restitution or in certain cases that 
they will be punished. Generally speaking any one can violate the law, if he is willing 
to pay for it. Even if he is enjoined before hand by the law, he can still violate it if 
he is willing to pay the penalty. This no doubt comes in part from the idea that a 
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is identified with the social aggregate, the state is bound only as 
long as it is willing to remain_ bound. Theoretically this is true in 
England with its doctrine of parliamentary omnipotence, although 
Coke denied it. It is not true in the United States where the dis-
crimination between the social aggregate and the government is 
recognized. 
The case involving the Adamson law63 illustrates such a situa-
tion. It was the law passed by Congress at the terrified request of 
the President. The law was upheld by a bare majority of the court. 
The reasoning in the opinion, if such mental processes can fairly be 
called reasoning, was to this effect. Congress has no constitu-
tional power to fix the wages to be paid by interstate railroads to 
employees. This Adamson law fixes such wages ; it is therefore 
prim a f acie unconstitutional. But Congress constitutionally could 
fix such wages temporarily provided it was necessary to obtain the 
parties an opportunity to come to an agreement on wages, and to 
keep the railroads operating in the meantime. Congress at the time 
the law was being passed could have passed a law giving the parties 
an opportunity to agree, by forbidding the strike and compelling a 
compulsory arbitration. This means that Congress had power to 
make arbitration compulsory. Hence the part of the proposition 
above which speaks of opportunity to agree is wholly irrelevant. 
Therefore the Adamson law was not necessary either to allow the 
parties to agree or to prevent a s!rike, and no occasion was presented 
for passing this law. The moment the Chief Justice conceded that 
Congress had the clear power to forbid the strike and enforce a 
compulsory agreement, the case was no longer arguable. The 
assertion of a crisis, or public sacrifice by a strike was entirely 
baseless. The only crisis was that Congress was at the moment 
given a choice to pass a constitutional law or to pass one that was 
unconstitutional. Even the decision of the court annulling the law 
could occasion no crisis, for Congress could forbid a strike and 
enforce an arbitration. This was the only point. It was not noticed 
in either opinion nor was it argued by counsel. The majority opinion 
refutes itself. If the opinion correctly states a rule of law the rule 
is that Congress can create a crisis justifying an unconstitutional 
law by refusing to pass a constitutional one. Such a situation is 
no sort of vis major and the opinion is even worse than that of the 
German prize court in the Appam case holding at the direction of 
man could either submit his case to a court or submit to outlawry. A developing social 
sense is slowly supplanting this idea of option, with the conception that it is wrong to 
violate the law to the injury of another. 
03 \Vilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. 
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the government against all international law that it had jurisdiction 
of an alleged prize lying in an American harbor, because, forsooth, 
the Appam could not be brought within the jurisdiction of the court. 
But such constitutional chickens generally come home to roor . 
Congress should then and there have been forced to do what the 
court stated was within its constitutional power and, therefore, was 
its duty. If it had been forced we would not now be threatened 
with the renewed danger of a strike in the midst of war but would 
be meeting a demand for another arbitration. The court simply 
created an endless chain of crises by paltering. The consequences 
were deplorable. The railroads were by this mandate brought much 
nearer practical bankruptcy, their revenues confiscated without their 
being h_eard as to the justice of the edict, and at last the railroads, 
kicked from pillar to post between the Inter-State Commerce Com-
mission and the courts, had to be taken possession of by the gov-
ernment to prevent their universal collapse. If Congress had the 
manhood even now to prohibit strikes on the great public high-
ways and to enforce compulsory arbitration and the Lilliputians on 
the Commerce board should gain a modicum of practical sense, 
this great Gulliver of a country would cease to be a subject of 
laughter in its helplessness. But Puck's remark still holds good, 
and we are diverted by an investigation into the conduct of a 
leguleius out of his depth. What was needed to meet the Adamson 
law and what is always needed in democracies is the courage of 
the Great Chief Justice when he frowned down the wretched crew 
of Jefferson and his partisans. He was pre-eminently a man who 
knew and knowing dared to maintain the meaning of the lines as 
true today as two thousand years ago : 
"Justum et tenacem propositi virmn 
Non civium ardor prava jubentium 
Mente quatit solida." 
The "civiitm ardor prava jubentiitni" was that of a class claiming 
to override the law. Nothing in the history of the court is more 
inspiring than the famous opinion of Stanley Matthews, now frit-
tered away, when in the face of a clamoring mob he held for the 
court that even helpless and friendless Chinese laundrymen were 
protected by the law of the land. Probably the high water mark 
of all judicial action was that of the English court in the presence 
of war holding the orders in council to be contrary to international 
law. Justice hath her victories even in an age of "sophisters and 
calculators", but we ought to be grateful that any court survived 
Taney and Chase. 
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The so-called sovereignty of a government is divisible into its 
legislative, its executive or administering, and its judicial power. 
These powers are fixed by our constitutions as separate and inde-
pendent and independently to be exercised. Theoretically they are 
separate in every government. They are not parts of the same 
power as sometimes asserted, for they have absolutely nothing in 
common. In late times in this country we have been imitating the 
German police state and creating a fourth kind of anomalous and 
bastard power called administrative.64 We have judicial power 
administered by administrative boards and legislative power wielded 
by such boards. This development has introduced a great deal of 
confusion, and gradually the bureaucracy is entrenching itself per-
manently. This remark, it may seem superfluous to say, does not 
apply to the activities of the country in war and to the numerous 
boards rendered necessary as purely administrative assistants. 
One of the favorite subjects of professorial assault is the judicial 
power in this country of deciding which of two conflicting laws is 
supreme. The courts do not in fact decide the point since the su-
preme law declares itself to be supreme. The sole function of the 
court is to ascertain the merely formal matter whether two laws 
are in conflict. The objection to holding statutes unconstitutional 
is incomprehensible to men with legal minds, for to deny it is to 
deny that men are entitled to equality before the law, the basic 
notion of justice. The simple question is whether the government 
is bound by the law. 
There are the judgments rendered by courts and the judgments 
rendered by administrative bodies. This development has intro-
duced confusion in regard to the well known division in the law. 
In the ancient world thought had not analyzed the different functions 
of government. Their rulers took the customary law and sometimes 
enacted it or let it alone, as did Sir Henry Maine's Runjeet Singh, 
I think it was, in the Punjab. The courts and the assemblies among 
the Greeks both legislated and adjudged very often in regard to the 
same matter, and Aristotle showed this to be a great error. In 
Rome the praetors legislated and then applied the rules they had 
formulated, but regular legislative bodies were also judicial bodies, 
like the senate or the comitia. In European countries there has 
never been any controlling division. Montesquieu pointed out with 
clearness the executive, the legislative and the judicial functions of 
government. Legislation establishes rules for the future. An ex 
"'1fany pages of pro-German stuff in our legal magazines have been written on this 
theory which has cursed us with a lot of boards which use the government printing of· 
fice to puff themselves. 
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post facto or retroactive law or a legislative judgment such as a bill 
of attainder or a decree of divorce, is not legislation whatever else 
it may be. The executive power cannot legislate nor can it ad-
judicate. The judicial power can only adjtJdicate. It can renc.l 1 
a judgment upon a particular concrete state of facts. Every judicial 
act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. The figure 
of its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts, 
a finding that the facts of the particular case are those certain facts 
and the application of the rule is a logical necessity. The old syl-
logism, "All men are mortal, Socrates_ is a man, therefore he is 
mortal", states the exact form of a judicial judgment. The existing 
rule of law is: Every man who with malice aforethought kills an-
other i~ the peace of the people is guilty of murder. The defend-
ant with malice aforethought killed A.B. in the peace of the people, 
therefore the defendant is guilty of murder. 
The rule of law and its application may be reached in a thousand 
different ways, but a judgment of a court is always this pure deduc-
tion. Now it must be perfectly apparent to any one who is willing 
to admit the rules governing rational mental action that unless the 
rule of the major premise exists as antecedent to the ascertainment of 
the fact or facts put into the minor premise, there is no judicial act 
in stating the judgment. The man who claims that under our system 
the courts make law is asserting that the courts habitually act un-
constitutionally. In other countries the question of division of power 
is not important for in England parliament is omnipotent, in France 
the division is not imperative, in · Germany the government is 
omnipotent. 
In the philosophy of the law another question has arisen which 
presents no difficulty whatever, if the distinction between national 
society, the state or the nation. and the government erected by law 
is kept in mind. From our earliest history we have been accustomed 
to the fact that the Federal government was the creation of an agree-
ment made at a definite time and place while it was no less apparent 
that the national society was something very different, indissoluble 
in its character and the result of a natural growth. But in countries 
like Germany where society and the state is identical with the gov-
ernment, a real difficulty is presented. Until 1870 the Prussian 
theory of the absolute identity of the social organism and the gov-
ernment as metaphysically outlined by Hegel, was complete. But 
when the German Empire was formed a federated government ap-
peared. There was no question regarding the unity of Germany's 
social organization. There was no question of the fact that the 
unity of the German social aggregate was a natural growth while 
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the German Empire as a ruling government was the creation of an 
agreement which had been made at a definite time and place. The 
German legal philosophers were at sea. As has been pointed out by 
M. Duguit, Gerber denies unlimited power to the government, he 
differentiates between the government and the social aggregate and 
even to the social aggregate he denies unlimited power, thus agree-
ing with an enunciation of our Supreme Court in Loan Association 
v. Topeka. Jellinek, while he differentiated society and the state by 
which he means the government, and afterwards says the separa-
tion is possible only as :an abstract conception, still clung to the 
Prussian state theory, and he held that the government was bound 
by the laws only because it was self limited.65 In this Jellinek was 
merely following Jhering who reached the same result by a sort 
of transcendental reasoning.66 The Bavarian Seydel went to the 
other extreme, and in order to prove Bavaria a sovereignty denied 
sovereignty to the empire or that it was even a state. Then he re-
asserted in the most violent form the Prussian theory of the state 
and applied it to insignificant Bavaria, which was exactly like the 
wretched State of South Carolina insisting that it was sovereign and 
the nation its creature. But M. Duguit does not note that Preuss67 
completely undermined the whole Hegelian theory by revising 
the notion of sovereignty. Singularly enough in this country where 
the distinction between the social aggregate, the nation and the gov-
ernment artificially constituted has always been recognized, this 
deceptive theory of sovereignty has always been clung to. Preuss 
rejects the notion of absolute sovereignty and shows that "there is 
in reality no sovereign state, exercising an absolute and unlimited 
authority. The authority of each state is in fact limited, and de-
pends externally upon international relations and internally upon 
the organization of the different groupings which compose it. It is 
impossible to confute the arguments which Preuss brings forward".68 
Kohler takes refuge in vague generalities69 but in effect agrees with 
Preuss. It is worthy of note that Fritz Berolzheimer in his World's 
Legal Philosophies is so imbued with the Prussian professorial 
mental hypocrisy, which consists in ignoring what does not suit its 
purpose, that he declines to notice in his much touted exhaustive 
work either Gerber, Seydel or Preuss although he gives much space 
to the self limitation theory of the state as bound by law. 
05 See Duguit, The Law and the State, Har. Law Rev. 119, 123 • 
.. See Duguit op. cit. 126, 148. 
01 Gemeinde, Staat, Reich. 
05 Korkunov, Theory of Law (Hastings' Translation), 340 • 
.. Kohler, Philosophy of Law, 297. 
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We come finally to international law. Private international law 
will always be applied and enforced by the tribunals of a particular 
state and we are not. further concerned with it here. Public inter-
national law governs the external relations of states between therr -
selves. If coercive power or a judicial tribunal or tribunals coex-
tensive with the law are necessary to the conception of law then 
there is no international law. But international law is not a theory, 
it is a fact. It is recognized the world over and treated as existing 
law by the courts of every civilized country. No theory can repeal 
the fact. Even Jellinek admits that there is an international law, 
that coercion and tribunals are not necessary to the conception of 
law but he takes the secession ground that whenever international 
law co~es in conflict with the supposed interests of a particular state 
it must yield to that state. But this theory leaves no international 
law. On the other hand we have our Supreme Court asserting in 
the strongest possible way that no one nation can vary a rule of 
international law.70 Gareis recognizes its existence71 and Kohler 
asserts with positiveness that there is a supernational law of much 
the same character as the law of federated states.72 
We have now surveyed the field of existing law and found that 
the sources, at least, of all private and public law, are custom and 
legislation, and of public international law are custom, treaties and 
conventions. The addition of treaties and conventions between na-
tions is rendered necessary by the fact that in the field of inter-
national law these elements are often equivalent to legislation. 
vr. 
SCHOOLS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. 
The school which is the oldest is in fact the only school of legal 
philosophy that has ever accomplished results. Men who talk about 
the so-called school of natural law rarely betray any knowledge of 
what the term means. It advocates the application of rationalized 
justice to the rules of positive law. As we have seen, the social 
human mind as a necessity of its development looks through the 
hum-drum, every day life of man and his imperfect functioning as 
a social being to an ideal world where justice alone shall reign. 
The ancients who saw life more clearly in certain ways than we 
••The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170; and Miller v. Ship Resolu· 
tion, :z Dall. 1, under Confederation. 
n Gareis, Science of Law, 75, 289. 
u Kohler, Philosophy of Law, 296, 300. 
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see it, because they saw it divested of the vast mass of the machinery 
of life which confuses our thoughts and blurs our vision, dreamed 
of an age when Astraea would return to earth and all law would 
become so perfect that all men would instinctively obey it. The 
ideal was correct and is still the controlling ideal. Some of the 
noblest expressions in literature show this craving of humanity. The 
great dramatist, 
"whose even-balanced soul 
From first youth tested up to extreme old age 
Business could not make dull or passion wild; 
Who saw life steadily and saw it whole;" 
has told us of "the laws that in the highest heaven had their birth, 
neither did the race of mortal men beget them nor shall oblivion 
ever put them to sleep, for the power of God is mighty in them 
and groweth not old".74 This eternal craving is that to which Cicero 
appealed as "the law which was never written and which we were 
never taught, which we never learned by reading, but which was 
drawn from nature herself, in which we have never been instructed 
but for which we were made, which was never created by man's 
institutions, but with which we are all imbued".711 This was the 
future universal world law of Cicero quoted by Judge S'rORY in 
Swift v. Tyson,16 when laying down a rule of general law: "There 
will not be one law at Rome, another at Athens, one today and an-
other tomorrow, but everywhere and among all races and at all 
times, one and the same law shall obtain."77 This law dictated by 
the highest reason of man the Romans called natural law, the law 
of nations, and nobly the Roman jurisconsults labored on the superb 
edifice which is still being repaired and adorned. These ideas con-
verted the raw jus civile into a jus naturale, discovered by a just 
consideration of the agreement or disagreement of human actions 
with the social mind of man, the product of the greatest body of 
lawyers this world has ever seen, not excepting the English and the 
French. It is an attempt to accommodate law to ideal justice. 
Our greatest publicist speaks with the amplitude and spirit of 
Cicero: 
"Justice is the greatest interest of man on earth. It is the ligament 
which holds civilized nations together. Wherever her temple stands, 
and as long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social 
•• Sophocles, Oediqus Rex, 863. 
"Cicero pro Milone, 10. 
•• 16 Pet. 1, 19, quoted from Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887. 
n Cicero, De Rep. III, 22. 
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security, general happiness, and the improvement and progress of 
our race. And whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness and 
distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, 
adorns its entablatures or contributes to raise its august dome still 
higher in the skies, connects himself in name, and fame, and char-
acter, with that which is and must be as durable as the frame of 
human society." 
He, too, was a disciple of the school of natural law. This ideal 
for which the great and good of this earth have striven is the teach-
.ing of the school of natural law, and in spite of the deadly legal 
Philistine it is still the ideal toward which the great and the good 
are striving. Its system of jurisprudence came to be regarded as a 
univers?-1 law of all mankind, common to all European nations, be-
cause resting on the nature of things and the general sense of 
equity obtaining among all men, a sort of natural law exacting 
recognition everywhere by its inherent reasonableness. The theory 
of this school was that an ideal system of law could be constructed 
by means of reason working with the sense of justice and right, to 
which all rules of positive law should be made to accord, and they, 
so far as they did not accord with it, were unsound and indefensible. 
In modern times Grotius and his followers upon this basis founded 
a theory and practice of international law, and it is plain that inter-
national law can find no other basis. The horrors of the Thirty 
Years War, perpetrated fortunately by Germans upon other Ger-
mans, led to the development of that international law recognized by 
all civilized nations until the Kaiser arrogantly announced: "There 
is no longer an international law". And we may hope that these 
new German horrors will mark another great advance in interna-
tional law by enforcing again on the broken savages the rule of in-
ternational justice. All the really great names in the philosophy of 
law were natural law advocates. Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists, 
K:ant, Fichte and Hegel were disciples of this school. All the noted 
international jurists are its devoted adherents. Schopenhauer, the 
one clear thinker among the German metaphysicians, asserted a pure 
ethical law which created a science of law independent of all statutes. 
The school is just as powerful today; whenever a legal philosopher 
appeals to the ideal of justice, whosoever admits that that ideal is 
what the law must strive for, whoever believes that the law should 
be consciously fashioned in aid· of justice among men, which is 
merely the expression of the social mind devoted to its social ideal 
of freedom and equality, is burning incense before the shrines of 
this school. All the men who denounce the school of natural law 
recognize its efficacy. Savigny and Puchta are just as surely bound 
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to it as Kohler or Stammler. Volumes have been written by men to 
denounce it, and yet in the midst of their denunciations they were 
appealing to its ideals. It will always survive, for it is based upon 
an unalterable fact, a constant aspiration of the normal human 
social mind. The men who think it dead are only deluding them-
selves, and when they appeal to reason and justice, they assume 
its livery. 
But this school of law was too narrow. Men do not live by ideals 
alone. Its ideal was sound enough for a part of law, but it ignored 
certain facts in human society. A natural law unchangeable, eternal 
and universal, resulting necessarily from man's nature, is impos-
sible for the whole of law. It does not take into consideration the 
changing life and improving nature of man, nor. that the social 
mind of man is constantly adapting itself in a greater degree to the 
social life of man. Certain fundamental parts of law and the mat-
ters that condition all legal rules with their infinite variety are in 
fact unchangeable. The main features of the family law, of suc-
cession, of the laws protecting human life, of the general rules 
as to obligations and as to property will be just as sound when 
Macauley's New Zealander shall be sitting on a broken arch of Lon-
don Bridge; but a great part of the law is relative and the result 
of race and time. Many of its rules are '{ariable. There is a great 
mass of law that as we have seen is not connected with morality. It 
might just as well be otherwise. It exists because it !s necessary 
to have some rule. This part of law was seen very clearly to be 
a development of the national life. It has nothing to do with the 
school of natural law or its tenets. Another school, therefore, arose 
which laid its whole emphasis upon the historical development of 
the law as it progressed in orderly succession from one rule to an-
other. Hugo and Savigny were its founders, but they had found 
nothing new. They believed that by showing that the law had 
developed naturally and regularly, there was no necessity for as-
suming that there was any system of natural law. The reasons for 
the law need not be looked for in reason; there was no longer any 
danger in denying natural law, for it was not admitted by the 
denial that all law was purely arbitrary and therefore indefensible. 
Law was shown to be historically a necessity, and a sure develop-
ment of human history not created by arbitrary human will, but 
by the steady social development of a nation. This school even 
went further and said that the germ of every nation's law was in the 
race and all the development of the law was the growth and de-
velopment of the germ. This is the organic theory attempted to 
be proven biologically by Spencer and his imitators. This school 
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was bound to fall for the reason that all law becomes a purely 
animistic development; whatever is, is right, because it could not 
be otherwise. Positive or existing law becomes not only the only 
law, but the only possible law. Human will and purpose, the con-
scious effort on man's part to improve society becomes a myth as 
baseless as the labors of Hercules. Men instinctively felt and knew 
that they were not helpless, that there was an ideal toward which 
they could strive. Then came the school of Stahl and Lasson who 
maintained the proposition of the ideal system of natural law exist-
ing along with the positive law. But here again they grasped but 
a part of the truth since their ideal system was non-existent, a mere 
set of legal ideals, and must be necessarily a growing and improv-
ing system because it was the product of growing and improving 
human minds. The folly of comparing an ideal as one existing 
system with another system existing as a fact, the impossibility of 
putting conceptions so different in their natures upon any common 
basis offered no difficulty to men who could identify the thinking 
subject with the thought-of object. At last Stammler tried to 
reconcile the historical and the natural law schools by his theory 
of "a natural law with a variable content", an improving and growing 
sense of justice. This would be well enough if there were not many 
things in the law which are unchangeable and eternal. But the 
existence of international law is easily reconcilable with the tenets 
of the historical school, and it is a necessity to the school of natural 
law. 
Savigny being of French descent had the courage of his convic-
tions and boldly asserted the folly of legislation and the impossibility 
of men changing the law by their conscious purpose. The dogmas of 
the historical school ceased to reign as a new school had seized the 
thought that only positive law does or can exist and on that basis 
had founded the so-called analytical school whose great names are 
Austin and, with faltering and reluctant steps, Sir Henry Maine. 
They were really a combination of Hobbes and Bentham. That was 
law which was law in a particular country at a particular time, and 
that alone. This is true, but it is nothing to the purpose. This 
school first appropriated the absolutist theory of Hobbes that law 
was rules imposed by the ruler upon the subject, and they insisted 
upon legislation to change the law. Austin defined law as the set 
of rules set by men as politically superior to other men as politically 
subject. These men politically superior are the government whether 
it be Kaiser, the Council of Ten, a ruling oligarchy, a representa-
tive parliament, a congress, or a popular meeting. It included 
everything from Khammurabi to a meeting of the miners of a min-
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:ng district in early California. This school deified legislation and 
:i.ccepted Bentham's crude theories of legislation. A German named 
Jhering took the thought, called it Purpose in Law, and boldly 
::laimed to be its inventor. 
This theory was compelled to account for the fact that law was 
mainly a natural growth out of previous conditions. Legislation, 
:onscious purpose, touched it very lightly. The historical school had 
deprecated legislation, had insisted that religious beliefs and customs 
had made the greater part of law when re-enforced by the reason-
ings of jurisprudence. The law was the work of silently working 
forces not the will of a law giver, and the greater part of the rules 
enforced as law in any court were not imposed by any superior. 
This objection was met by the proposition that the rules of law en-
forced by courts were permitted by the superior, and therefore im-
posed by it. At once the theory was in the hornet's nest that the 
law permits nothing, it commands or forbids. If all that is per-
mitted is law, then all human conduct is regulated by the command 
of the superior, a reductio ad absttrdmn. But there was a prelim-
inary difficulty to be met even before the one just indicated. Half 
the statute book was like our Sherman law repealed by unanimous 
consent and not enforced in any way. It was found that the con-
sent of the governed was in the end necessary to complete legisla-
tion. So Markby adds to Austin's definition the qualification that 
the rules of law must be generally obeyed. It seemed, then, that 
the sovereign command did not make law at all, but the general con-
sent of the obeying subjects made it, which fact destroyed Austin's 
definition and the law was defined as by the historical school. Hol-
land deserted the question of the causation of law and said that 
law is a system of rules governing men's external acts enforced by 
a sovereign political authority, and since law is enforced by judicial 
tribunals, it seemed to follow that the enforcement by a judicial 
tribunal was the test of law, and hence the step was easy to the 
thought that courts made law. This was followed without conscious 
assent by our Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Hor.MES who 
worked off with no little cynical, though, no doubt, concealed, amuse-
ment on his innocent brethren (who had never troubled themselves 
about a philosophy of law) the definition of law that the court was 
every day denying and against which a hundred of its decisions 
could be quoted, that "law is a statement of the circumstances in 
which the public force will be brought to bear through the courts".78 
This seemed to the court the perfectly innocent statement that if a 
fS American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 356. 
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rule is law the courts will enforce it. Courts are the only people 
who do not know what a violent presumption this is. They seem 
imbued with the idea that they follow the law. The most that can 
be allowed them is that generally they try to do so. But the sense 
in which the court took Justice HOLMES' proposition is not what he 
meant. The sentence means the exact opposite. It means that a 
rule is law because the courts enforce it, and for no other reason, 
and that a rule does not exist until particular circumstances are be-
fore a court; and, therefore, it is the court that makes the law, a 
proposition once again urged by Justice HOLMES in another case 
in a dissenting opinion, where he showed what he really meant and 
the majority of the court overruled him.79 
The theory that courts make law is the thesis maintained in Gray's 
Nature and Sources of Law, but the very instances he cites prove 
that courts do not make law, for the simple reason that the cases 
he cites are all based on pre-existing rules.80 Any opinion can be 
read and the decision will be seen to be a deduction from a more 
general rule. An application of a rule to a new case does not make 
a new rule. Mr. Gray puts the case of "what was the law in the 
time of Richard Coeur de Lion on the liability of a telegraph com-
pany to the persons to whom a message was sent." This illustrates 
that he is not thinking about law at all, but about the rules of think-
ing. He states a concrete case of fact and asks what general rule 
of law would apply in the time of the Lion Hearted. The answer is 
plain. His concrete case was then non-existent, and it is mentaJiy 
impossible to conceive of a rule of law governing non-existent human 
conduct. Professor Gray has simply perpetrated a psychological 
absurdity. He also does not see the difference between a rule of 
law and a judgment on a concrete state of facts. He might as well 
ask for the law among the Wanyamwezi as to fellow servants. The 
difference is a matter of the rules of thinking which must be settled 
before you attempt to apply them. 
It happens that we as well as all civilized countries have judicial 
tribunals. These judicial tribunals ascertain as best they can what 
"Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349. If a man desires to see where the 
idea that courts make law lands a rational mind, let him analyze the dissenting, opinion. 
If he thinks it sound, he may be absolutely certain that he does not know what Jaw is. 
so See his whole chapter iv. The opposite view in the book of a very great lawyer, 
James C. Carter, Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, is not put very convincingly, 
because he is trying to deny that legislation makes law, a palpable error of fact. In 
17 Col. Law Rev. is a paper which contains more error than can anywhere be found 
in the same space. In the Bering Sea Arbitration, Mr. Carter in order to support the 
absurd position of our country threw overboard his beliefs, and maintained a philosophy 
of right theory of international law. He was, of course, utterly demolished by Sir 
Charles Russell. 
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are the general rules of law. They do not consciously invent rules 
for they all recognize that any judgment which they give is founded 
upon a major premise which must be an existing rule of law. If 
they do not do this, they are not performing a judicial act. Suppose 
a court should avow that out of its own head it made a rule, would 
it legislate? The answer is no, because the application which they 
make of the rule is to a past state of facts. Therefore when a man 
talks of a court making law, he must be referred to treatises on 
psychology and logic. The fact that courts announce rules of law 
is a mere accident. Suppose that they followed the rule of merely 
announcing their judgments without giving reasons. For nine courts 
out of ten this would be an excellent rule. Years ago a judge of 
the Territorial Federal Court in Wyoming told me that he had be-
come so disgusted with stupid reversals that at one term when he 
had twelve chancery cases, he took the six cases where the com-
plainants' names came earlier in the alphabet and decided those for 
the complainants, the remaining six he decided for the defendants. 
He gave no reasons. They were all appealed, and those were the 
only cases at any term which were all affirmed. If this story is 
non vero, it is certainly ben trovato. 
No one not blinded by our system would ever suppose that courts 
make law. It has never occurred to a European lawyer to make 
such a supposition, because they have not our system of precedents. 
This idea of law is our peculiarly provincial contribution. There 
are literally hundreds of legal systems in full working order on 
this earth today, whose rules are absolutely binding and observed, 
which are neither laid down by a superior power nor announced 
nor enforced by courts. The mere accident of machinery has been 
mistaken for the characteristic of the abstract idea. Law is a con-
cept, a generalized abstraction attained by mental processes. Gen-
eralized concepts such as horse are type ideas which result from 
observation, but a generalized concept like law is itself a higher 
abstraction from other abstract notions, which exist only in the 
mind. The various rules of law are themselves abstract generaliza-
tions. The attempt to define law is simply the attempt to find what 
the various abstract rules have in common. It is not coercion by 
state power because that element is no part of the abstract rules. 
It is not the fact that it is laid down by a superior power because 
the rules have not that element in common. It is not the fact that 
the rules are stated by courts, for that fact is not a common ele-
ment. Nor do any of these facts enter into the abstraction. The 
mere abstraction would not be important if the definitions above 
did not exclude public international law. It is among the disciples 
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of the_ analytical school that international law is being beset in the 
house of its friends, of those who ought to be its defenders (in courts 
which have gone so far as to say that the rules of public interna-
tional law are a part of the municipal law), who are "reiterating 
stab on stab". Certainly we cannot give up public international law 
for a Philistine idea of the Saurian Cretaceous period in law, which 
is refuted by the laws of thinking, by the truths of history and 
by the demands of justice, which all require a rule of law ante-
cedent to a judicial decision. 
There is a book by Joseph H. Beale of Harvard,81 a part of which 
has appeared, which is to become the definitive treatise on private 
international law or as he very properly prefers to call it, the con-
flict of Jaws. It gives the strongest promise of being the best legal 
work done in this generation. It unites industry and erudition to 
keenly discriminating thought and in it the author has exhausted 
the abstract concept of law. His studies were in a department 
where he was required to free himself from the usual erroneous 
limitations. He saw a whole system of law that was practically 
virgin ground to the law giver. It bore the marks of the labors 
of many centuries of the natural law thinkers. It gave all the proofs 
of its noble historical origin, and its orderly development. It has 
been illustrated by the labors of jurists. Mr. Beale himself had 
written a book upon the great mediaeval authority Bartol us, 82 which 
every lawyer who is better than a ''leguleiits, catttits atqite acutus", 
ought to read with delight. It was positive law, daily applied by 
the courts in many different lands, and yet no tribunal existed whose 
jurisdiction enabled it to lay down the law for all its different 
spheres of operation. Here was a body of law that no one could 
deny and yet it rested on nothing else than the age old sanction 
of law, its general acceptance. He saw, none more clearly, that 
this body of law like all other law, had a set of general principles 
which gave it standing as science, but which blossomed into many 
particular rules. He defines law as "the body of general principles 
and of particular rules in accordance with which civil rights are 
created and regulated and wrongs prevented and redressed". He 
uses civil rights as a term of widest import, and he points out that 
the characteristic of law as a living system, is the fact of its ac-
ceptance. This definition of law is reconcilable with all its attributes. 
81 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, p. 132. In Korkunov, Theory of Law, there is an 
attempt to define law as a limiting of the sphere of rights, which does not meet the dif· 
ficulties. 
• 2 The book on Bartol us may be read with the life, much more sketchy, in Great 
Continental Jurists. 
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It leaves scope and play for the gross errors of courts.83 It gives 
room for public international law in the fact of acceptance by all 
civilized nations, and in the fact that rights are created by it and 
wrongs redressed according to its rules. When Germany attempts 
to repudiate this law, she is refuted by her own jurists. Practically 
all writers agree that the effect of law is to delimit rights in one per-
son with corresponding duties in others to respect those rights. This 
situation creates legal relations. So far all are agreed as to the situa-
tion between citizens. But all agree that the citizen stands in legal 
relations with his government. If this be so, the citizen must have 
rights complemented by duties on the part of the government. In 
our country these rights and duties are defined by the organic law. 
But all agree that governments bear legal relations toward one an-
other, and those relations are and must be defined by law, which 
is international law, as the Germans admit. One of them, Kohler, 
as we shall see, trying to account for his statements as to the exist-
ence and binding force upon nations of international law, emits the 
ludicrous Teutonic roar that his "honest German nature" had been 
83 It is painful to have to record another of Justice Holmes' careless and debonair 
utterances. In Kawananokoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, he must have completely misled 
his associates into concurring in a statement of the law that is not only not correct, but 
actively vicious. He says: "Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the 
immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer 
has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan Chap. 26, 2. A 
sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, 
but on the logical and practical ground that there can he no legal right as against the 
authority that makes the law on which the" right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir 
loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner Ioy', Bodin Republique i, 
chap. 8 (Ed. 1629), p. 132". The French sentence means, "For one can very well re-
ceive law from another, but it is naturally impossible to give law to oneself". Here we 
have the German theory that the government cannot be bound by law put forward in 
its rawest form. The authorities quoted are the Philosopher of Malmesbury, the advocate 
of royal absolutism, and a Frenchman who believed in quidquid principi placuit habet 
legis vigorem. Justice Holmes never meant to assert such a thing. His associates 
never would have concurred in such doctrine. It was contrary to a hundred decisions 
of the court to the effect that the government could bind itself by laws, and the courts 
bad always enforced them. Tbe doctrine stated was not the ground of the rule. That 
doctrine was obsolete theory except in Germany. If the statement is true, the govern· 
ment cannot be bound by the law. The statement is astonishing and to all Americans 
who understand it, intensely humiliating. The point decided, however, was correctly de-
cided. The reason for the rule is public convenience, for all sorts of actions would be 
brought against the government if the rule did not exist. But if opinions make law, it 
is law today in this benighted country that the government cannot bind itself by the 
laws it promulgates. There is no logical basis for such a rule and can be none, and one 
naturally inquires of our Supreme Court, que le diable faites·vo11s da11s cette galere. But 
this is the trouble when a judge announces law on his own researches. Bracton, Fortescue 
and Coke denied his proposition. It was never true in Imperial Rome nor in France. 
See Le Maxime, Princeps Legibus Solutus Est by Esmein, Essays in Legal History, 1913, 
Vinogradolf. I can only quote Coke's words in Calvin's case, I think, that Justice Holmes 
has given "a damnable and damned opinion". 
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deceived into telling the truth. But the fact that private inter-
national law exists is proof positive that .a public jus gentittm exists. 
As we have seen, there is a certain stage in the development of law 
where a legal profession necessarily comes into existence. This 
legal profession after its advent will determine the acceptance of 
law and its meaning. Just as in mediaeval Year Books, no writ 
would_ stand against the opinion of the sergeants, so no principle 
of law will stand today against the opinion of the profession. One 
of the practical objections to the judicial-decision analytical school 
is that there is unloaded on the science of jui;-isprudence all the mani-
fold mistakes of courts. There_ is no certainty that a decision has 
stated a rule until the statement has stood the test of time and 
acceptap.ce. It is not necessary to refer to cases where the courts 
have made mistakes by first enunciating one rule and later finding 
they were wrong. We may take a case where a court has had two 
identical cases before it and mirabile dictu has decided them in the 
same way, applying a principle or a rule. One case is appealed and 
reversed. The other is not appealed, and the judgment stands. The 
first rule of justice which is impartiality, has been violated by an 
accident. Shuffling out of this difficulty, they say that law is made 
by courts of last resort. If so, whether there be law in a court 
decision, depends upon the accident of appeal, a wholly nonsensical 
conclusion. Again a decision is made and an appeal taken. In 
the meantime another case between the parties involving the same 
point comes on for trial. By the doctrine of res judicata the first 
decision decides the second case. It also is appealed. On the same 
day in the same court, the two cases are decided. The first case 
is reversed, the second is affirmed, rightly because the effect of the 
first judgment was not suspended by appeal. This very case has 
happened. So far as the ultimate rights of the parties are concerned, 
two exactly contrary decisions have been made by the same court 
at the same time on the same subject-matter. This is the law of 
our Supreme_ Court of the United States, yet no one would con-
tend that the accidents of litigation made two diverse rules of law. 
It is merely certain that a great injustice was done by a clumsy 
procedure. Now shall lawyers admit that all the errors and mis-
takes of fallible men in the courts shall be unloaded on jurisprudence 
which is the noblest product of the human intellect? It is against 
these puny mistaken men that this great science has been waging 
her war for aeons and will continue to wage it long after we are 
gone. 
There has lately been proposed another school of legal philosophy 
called Sociological Jurisprudence which is said to have given up 
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the search for what law is and has concentrated 1ts efforts persum-
ably on what it ought to be .. Since there never was any jurisprudence 
that was not sociological, this school must profess "jurisprudence as 
is jurisprudence". It is claimed, however, in all apparent serious-
ness that this is a new school. It is said to be seeking for the ideal 
and enduring side of positive law, but this is merely the natural-law 
school given a new name, and curiously enough this hypothetical 
school is said to blame the natural law school for doing just what 
it proposes to attempt. Then it is said that this school seeks to de-
fine the legal order84 rather than to reach a definition of law. But 
this is the analytical school over again and Kohler repudiates his 
disciple, even as Bentham repudiated Dumont, and asserts that 
philosophy of law is the philosophic study of evolutionary processes 
by which law is formed, which is the historical school over again 
with certain K1tltur "Persicos apparahts". In this school we are 
shocked to find classed together Comte, Spencer, Ward, Jhering, 
Duguit, Sternberg, Berolzheimer, Merkel, Gumplowicz, Demogue, 
Kohler, Post and Dahn. M. Duguit between Jhering and Sternberg 
must feel (I say it in all reverence) as if he were being crucified 
between two thieves. sG This new school seems to be a hasty and 
unjustifiable generalization from Fritz Berolzheimer's book. Fritz 
is a perfect Fritz of Fritzes for he does not always tell the whole 
truth, but he never supposed, I venture to say, that the Neo-Kantians 
would be classed with the Neo-Hegelians and the Utilitarians. These 
people have literally nothing in common. They abuse each other 
like pirates. Kohler says Jhering has "a wholly unphilosophical 
head". Jhering trounces almost everybody. Spencer has nothing 
in common with these high prerogative divine-right-of-the-Kaiser 
Germans, nor with the Utilitarians. The school includes biologists, 
utilitarians and transcendentalists. It is much as if some new 
Cuvier should arise and announce in tones of thunder that he had 
discovered a new species of animals which all had this fact in com-
mon, that they ate food, and that the species comprised the elephant, 
the rhinoceros, the tiger, the eagle, the zebra, the jackal, the lion, 
the baboon and the vulture. But where in this list are Binding and 
Bierling with their "norms" which look like a new species of legal 
"worms''; they are analytical jurists ; and where are Seydel, Preuss, 
"' The "legal order" is one of those convenient vague German phrases with "a variable 
content'' that mean nothing. Only one who has followed the German "subjective" and 
"objective" through almost a hundred different senses, most of them contradictory, can 
form any adequate notion of this vagueness and looseness of thought. 
ss See the articles in 24 and 25 Har. Law Rev. on Sociological Jurisprudence and 15 
Col Law Rev. I have not verified the number of the last volume for one reading was 
quite enough. • 
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and Gerber? Berolzheimer left those out of his book, so the pro-
jector did not have them to classify. The inventor himself is the 
American protagonist of this school, but now comes Professor 
Kocourek and says that the inventor does· not belong here, and 
horresco referens, is in "a hostile camp of legal philosophy". This 
is very mystifying, especially as Professor Kocourek after his at-
tempt to comprehend this exhaustive work of Fritz ventures on cer-
tain schools himself. Those schools are the Positivist, the N eo-
Kantians and Neo-Hegelians, and he evidently classes the inventor, 
"one of our greatest juridicial scholars", along with Comte as a 
Positivist86 while he rejects the Natural-Law, the Analytical and the 
Historical schools altogether, although if he could have foreseen 
what t4.e inventor was going to do in his elaborate disquisition on 
the Natural-Law, Analytical and Historical schools, while classing 
all of Professor Kocourek's three schools together as one. school, 
he would not have been, we may hope, so temerarious. As it is, 
his classification has been treated by Dean Pound after Count von 
Luxburg's recipe of "spurlos versenkt". Both professors agree, how-
ever, in saying that Kohler, who is the elephant of sociology's new 
school, is "the first of living jurists". 
We dismiss the Sociological School of jurists as too involved 
"for human nature's daily food".87 If we attempt to generalize 
from the lucubrations of the schools, we see no reason to change 
Professor Beale's definition of law. It stands as an accurate de-
scription of the abstract conception of law. But the astonishing 
thing is that any one should have treated any of these schools seri-
ously. They practically agree on the facts. They differ on the 
theories. Each one seizes a part of the truth and proceeds to 
exploit his parcel as if it were the whole estate, and thereby com-
mits waste on the inheritance which all life tenants must avoid. 
VIL 
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No one is infallible, not even the Pope. In I868, John Hay, 
then an attache at Madrid, where he had written his lovely book 
"Castilian Days", came through Paris and told with great joy 
a story that was current in Madrid of that "amiable old pessimist", 
Pius IX. The Ecumenical Council of the Church under direct in-
.. See Kocourek's Introd. Kohler's Philosophy of Law, p. xv. 
sr In Har. Law Rev. xxxi, 373, Nathan Isaacs of the Cincinnati Law School has 
ventured on further schools. 
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spiration from on high had pronounced the dogma of Pius' in-
fallibility. But he had his doubts and to test his infallibility he had 
been trying his new powers on the weather and on lottery tickets 
with disastrous results to the dogma.88 It is rather a pity that cer-
tain professors of law have not some such method of ascertaining 
their own fallibility. But here let me say that the larger class of 
the law professors assume that they are to teach law and have no 
roving commission to assault all its rules and to abuse the legal 
profession. They know how difficult a matter it is to be a worthy 
member of such a profession. No one should attempt to apologize 
for all lawyers. In this country, the profession is burdened with 
many, perhaps a great majority, who have never been illuminated by 
"the gladsome light of jurisprudence". Many of them are mere 
"hacks" not even persons of good education, but no one can deny 
that in the history of this country lawyers have given a good ac-
count of themselves. There exists too often, a sort of hostility 
between the practical, practicing lawyer and those theoretical profes-
sorial colleagues, who think that they have become the depositaries 
of ultimate truth. It is mainly due to the fact that the theorist shows 
so little actual knowledge of jurisprudence as a practical art. Law-
yers are constantly seeing deliverances of the theorists that would 
not stand a day's practical test. The theorists are constantly carping 
at the profession for its imperviousness to ideas and its sordidness. 
The lawyers reply with truth that the professors have no concep-
tion of how carefully, minutely and thoroughly, with what liber-
ality of thought, an important case is prepared for trial, with what 
great research and attention to detail. If a question of statutory 
construction is involved, all the considerations which the theorists 
think themselves to have discovered, but which in fact have been 
the common basis of argument for many years, are carefully 
weighed, all the material that the Historical or the Natural-Law or 
the Analytical schools can furnish is searched and pondered; all 
the light possible from former analogous statutes is obtained, the 
situation the statute was designed to meet, the social reasons de-
manding it, the reasons in existing law for its enactment, the gen-
eral public policy involved, the demands of abstract justice and 
right, the interference, if any, with general rules-all is placed be-
fore the court; very often it is the useless task of margaritas ante 
porcos. All the reasons for a liberal or strict construction, the ap-
peal to the general spirit of the enactment, all the different rules 
MThis tale is in John Bigelow's Retrospect, I think in volume four. But any one 
who is desirous of verifying the story may consult the index. He will find diverting and 
some valuable material. 
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for interpretation are urged and debated, weighed and tested. The 
lawyers say that when one of them arises in court all his fallacies, 
shortcomings, lack of information and immaturity of reflection are 
exposed, while the professorial theorist never receives a criticism 
or reply, and thinks that because he can escape a lot of illy informed 
students without correction, he would pass muster everywhere. Even 
the judge upon the bench must submit, very often with ill grace, to 
an ex1!-austive examination of his opinion and exposure of any 
inadequacy in his reasoning. It is true that he can act like the 
professor and resent. criticism. Very often he does so, but the 
fact is not altered. The lawyers know how great and difficult a 
matter is the law, how much insight is required, how a perfect sys-
tem on_paper would be a monstrosity in actual use, how the law 
is always loaded with human imperfections, lack of ability, in-
capacity to discriminate, personal prejudices or ridiculous hobbies, 
how the judicial head seems often to be constructed of non-conduct-
ing material; and the lawyers claim that if the theorists were put 
into court, made to prepare and argue great questions, they would 
find that their new discoveries were as old as the hills and they 
would discover that their cackling over new discoveries had not even 
the hen's excuse of the production of one actual egg. The theorists 
accuse the lawy~rs of narrowness and intense conservatism and 
charge that they have no confidence in legislation. The lawyer replies 
that owing to the numberless mistakes which he sees, the silly and 
stupid statutes without number, he would be a criminal, if he were 
not a conservative; that the theorists with their J acobinical offer~ 
ings, abuse of law, decrying of the methods for the administration 
of justice and their attempts to unload their crude designs on a 
jurisprudence tested by the years are irritating and dangerous. 
They point to the law, to what it has done for civilization, and 
say that it suffers enough from human imperfections, that the theor-
ists are wrong in trying to hack our aged mother to pieces. They 
point to the vast complexity of human affairs, to the immense bur-
dens the law is called upon to bear and answer: 
"Yes, we arraign her, but she 
The weary Titan with deaf 
Ears and labor dimmed eyes, 
Regarding neither to right 
Nor left, goes passively by, 
Bearing on shoulders immense, 
Atlantean, the load 
Well nigh not to be borne 
Of the too vast orb of her fate." 
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It may be admitted that the practical lawyer does not exhibit a very 
receptive attitude toward legal philosophy. He can see nothing 
very valuable in English legal philosophy so far as it goes. Salmond 
or Miller or Amos or Austin or Lorimer are not of any value to him. 
Sir Henry Maine's books are interesting and suggestive. The Com-
mon Law of Holmes was exceedingly good if it had been true, but 
it had at any rate the rarest and best of all things, charm and in-
spiration and faultless diction. 
But the lawyer is told that Germany is the home of legal phil-
osophy. Now when we are told of this great philosophical litera-
ture, we are skeptical, but we naturally recur to the books that are 
open to all. There are Kant's, Hegel's, Puchta's, Jhering's and 
Kohler's Philosophies of Law, beside numerous other works. One 
opens Hegel's Philosophy of Law and one's mind goes back over the 
fugaces annos to the days when he was an undergraduate. The 
Universities were then filled with those who had gone to Germany 
to draw inspiration from the bubbling fountains of philosophical 
verbosity. The Germans had done great things in the world, the 
new German Empire was stupendous . and nothing succeeds like 
success. The great apparent good of Bismarck filled the world, 
the evil that was to live and fester and breed after him, was not 
yet known. The Universities were full of seminar courses and 
every one was talking German methods. It fell to my lot to sit 
under the ministrations of one of the great and early exponents of 
German philosophy, George S. Morris, whose death was so un-
timely. We threw ourselves with youthful enthusiasm upon Kant, 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Especially the German theory of the 
state was in the air. Our lecturers on political economy were talk-
ing the J acobinical stuff made popular by the German professorial 
"socialists of the chair'. The watchword then was Geist, intelligence 
applied to state affairs and in training the population, resulting in an 
Intelligenzstaat. Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy and 
Friendship's Garland had preached the healing power of Geist in 
lovely and moving tones. We panted for enlightenment as the heart 
panteth for the water-brooks. We pored over the Pure Reason and 
the Phenomonology of Spirit, but we found nothing to quench our 
thirst. Imagine our horror and dismay to find that Kant, the start-
ing point of German philosophy, had nothing new; it was the old 
agnosticism dressed up in many words. He was a Scotchman and 
had borrowed his ideas from Hume. He had once shown signs of 
trying to talk of free institutions, and had been promptly suspended 
and taught a bitter lesson, so that he never ventured into that field 
again, but had signed a full recantation to the effect that the sov-
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ereign power in the state was the existing government and that its 
law was holy; "A law which is so. holy and inviolable that it is 
practically a crime even to cast doubt upon it, or to suspend its op-
eration even for a moment, is represented of itself as necessarily 
derived from some Supreme, unblameable law-giver. And this 
is the meaning of the maxim, 'All authority is from God', which 
proposition does not express the historical foundation of the civil 
constitution, but an ideal principle of the practical reason. [We 
noted that this was not imputed to the pure reason .(die reine 
Vernunft), which was -concerned with truth, but to that practical 
reason (die praktische Vernunft), which was involved in his sal-
ary.] Hence it follows that the supreme power in the state has 
only rights and no (compulsory) duties toward the subject." This 
was the old divine right of kings, or of government, which Kant 
had made a tenet of the practical reason and to stop it, the English 
a hundred years before had cut off one king's head and chased an-
other from the realm. 
So we turned to Hegel and found that he strummed the same tune. 
He was opposed to all free government and representative institu-
tions. In international law he preached the doctrine that nothing 
was binding on a state, that states were in Hobbes' condition of 
"the war of all against all". He, too, held the doctrine of sovereignty 
vested in the monarch, who was a person and therefore made the 
state a personality. The power of the monarch was not derivative, 
but his right was a becoming unto itself, which in Hegel's language 
means absolute reality. "Accordingly, the conception which repre-
sents the right of the monarch to be founded upo11 divine authority 
is wholly exact, because in such notion is contained the uncondi-
tioned part of the monarch's right". Here we found again the Ger-
mans feeding on the dry husks of divine right which had been 
burned in 1688 in England and in France in 1789. 
Fries, a German publicist of the time when they still dared to 
think, said that Hegel's theory of the state had grown "not in the 
garden of science, but on the dunghill of servility". This is an ac-
curate description, and our philosophy of law is expected to roost 
upon that dunghill. Although Hegel conceals his views on juris-
prudence, we can discard his trinitarian system of thesis antithesis 
and synthesis and approximate his conceptions. Law he conceives 
as the antithesis of customary morality and their synthesis is true 
morality. The individual and the group are opposed but they are 
united in the family. The family and the civil society are opposed 
and they unite in the state. At bottom his idea, if he had one, is 
an attempt to reconcile individualism as opposed to society. 
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Efforts had been made to apply this German philosophy of law 
to our political institutions. At that time in the consulship of 
Arthur, the effort had been made by Mulford's "The Nation", a 
work long forgotten, I suppose. He propounded the following 
propositions in an attempt to apply the Hegelian theory to a state 
without a monarch; that the nation is founded in the nature of man 
and is a natural growth and relationship, is continuous and is an 
organism, a conscious organism, a moral organism and a moral 
personality. He stopped short of the Hegelian identification of the 
existing government with divine right. The interesting point in 
his book is the discrimination which he made between the nation 
as the social aggregate, the people, and the government, called the 
commonwealth. It was apparent to him that the people of the 
United States, the social aggregate, must be considered as formed 
and existing prior to our adoption of a constitution, otherwise the 
conception of Calhoun that the nation was a mere compact between 
states and therefore an artificial, not a natural and necessary growth 
and development, indivisible and eternal, could be fairly maintained. 
But the theory of Mulford had been already stated by Webster with 
precision in his speech, The Constitution not a Compact :89 "The 
Union is the association of the people, under a constitution or gov-
ernment, uniting their power, joining together their highest inter-
ests, cementing their present enjoyments, and blending, in one in-
divisible mass, all their hopes for the future". This is the theory, 
the existence of a nation, a social aggregate, anterior to the con-
stitution, which is the doctrine of our Supreme Court. In Chisholm 
v. Georgia00 the distinction between the government and the state, 
as the social organization, is noted in the phrase that the government 
has often claimed precedence over the state, which is the artificial 
person, the complete body of free persons united together for their 
common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own and to do 
justice to others. And Chief Justice ]AY said: "The Revolution, or 
rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already 
united for general purposes and at the same time providing for their 
more domestic concerns by state governments and other temporary 
arrangements". In Pennhallow v. Doane,91 the same assertion was 
made of the existence before the constitution of the one political 
body, which raised armies, conducted military operations, issued bills 
of credit, received and sent ambassadors and made treaties. In 
so \Vebster, \Vorks vi, 21r • 
.. 2 Dalt. 455. 
1113 Dall. 54-
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Te%as v. White,92 the court noted that the word 'state' is used first 
for the political community, second for the territory of the com-
munity and third for the government thereof. But the society con-
stitutes the state, and the united society is one state and one country. 
"The Uniol} never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It 
grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, similar interests 
and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by 
war and received definite form in the Articles of Confederation". 
In Lane v. Oregon, 93 it was asserted that the United States existed 
before the constitution. In Loan Association v. Topeka,94. Judge 
MILLER asserted that outside of the .constitutional limitations on 
the government were limitations arising from the nature of free 
government and beyond the control of even the state, the political 
aggregate. But Mulford did not see that his theory refuted Hegel's 
identification of the state, the nation, the social aggregate, with the 
particular form of government. Later, in England, attempts were 
made to furbish up the theory in a new form in Green's Principles 
of Obligation and Bosanquet's .Philosophical Theory of the State. 
Germany had grown into one political community. Events had dis-
posed of Hegel's theory, yet the Germans have never admitted it. 
It having become united, the rulers of the different states, the va-
rious kings, grand dukes and dukes (there was no nonsense about 
the people) by their agreement had constituted a government for 
the already existing German Empire. This ended the Hegelian 
theory and now Bavarian legal philosophers are claiming that the 
Empire is merely a league, that the God-given states are still the 
different social aggregates. They have adopted the Calhoun theory 
and applied it to the German Empire. But at the present time one 
who would deny the social unity of Germany must surely be daft. 
But we ought not to part from Hegel without a specimen of his 
line of thought. In his Phanomenologie des Geistes I take a sent-
ence at random from his great chapter: "When reason observes, 
this pure unity of ego and existence, the unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity, of for-itself-ness and in-itself-ness, this unity is im-
manent, has the character of implicitness or of being; and con-
sciousness of reason finds itself".95 This union of the thinking mind, 
the subject, and the thought of object is perfectly apparent to Hegel. 
92 7 Wall. 700. Here Chase stumbled on a thought, but like the politician he was, 
be proceeded to dilute it in the next sentences . 
.. 7 Wall. 71 • 
.. 20 Wall. 655. This is a good specimen of Miller's rugged writing. He was a strong 
legal personality. If be bad- been educated and bad bad the balance that comes from 
wide reading in the law, there would have been none greater. 
"'Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind (translation Baillie), p. 430. 
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He assumes it. I see my hat, that objective thing, the hat, creates 
an impression on my mind. That impression is a part of my mind. 
The mind was for itself. The hat was in itself. The two things 
unite in the hat impression and not until then am I conscious of rea-
son, but because I am so conscious the thinking mind has become 
one with the objective thing. What could be plainer? A man's 
mind finds itself in the in-itself-ness of his hat, while his pure ego 
"talks through its hat". Schopenhauer in his Essay on Style says 
of this sort of work: "The mask of unintelligibility holds out the 
longest; this is only in Germany, however, where it was introduced 
by Fichte, perfected by Schelling and attained its highest climax 
finally in Hegel, always with the happiest results. And yet nothing 
is easier than to write so that no one can understand. * * * The 
Germans from force of habit read page after page of all kinds 
of such verbiage without getting any definite idea of what the 
author really means. * * * Obscurity and vagueness of expression 
are at all times and everywhere a very bad sign. * * * Those writ-
ers who construct difficult, obscure, involved and ambiguous phrases 
most certainly do not rightly know what it is they wish to say:-
they have only a ditll consciousness of it which is still struggling to 
put itself into thought; they also often wish to conceal that in reality 
they have nothing to say. Like Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, they 
wish to appear to know what they do not know, to think what they 
do not think, and to say what they do not say." 
Kohler is constantly imputing to Hegel the application of the 
idea of evolution to history as if he were the inventor of it. This 
is a part of the general German theory of claiming everything, and 
is characteristic of their mental dishonesty. As a matter of fact, 
the whole idea of evolution is absent from Hegel's system. He 
could not have had it because to the idea of man's evolution his 
presence on this earth for at the lowest 250,000 years is neces-
sary, and Hegel believed in Archbishop Usher's chronology, by 
which man came on earth 4004 B. C. with the same mind that he 
has today. In Hegel's Philosophy of History he does not conceive 
of one form of civilization passing into something higher, but he 
take~ certain races as typical of certain manifestations of reason in 
humanity. This is entirely foreign to what they call Entwickelimgs-
geschichte. This uncouth word, meaning historical evolution, did 
not exist for Hegel. Hegel conceives of right as a development of 
reasoning, not as a product of the evolution of the mind. 
And this takes us on to Puchta who denies Hegel's whole as-
sumption that Reason produces the notion of right. Puchta says 
that freedom is the foundation of right, which is the essential prin-
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ciple of all law. Hence, says Puchta, it follows that it is not from 
the notion of Reason that we get to Right, as the principle of law.96 
This illustrates the superficial character of the German philosophy 
of law. It is all bare assertion. Freedom, that is to say, freedom 
from the aggression of others, is the foundation of law, because 
it is one of the basic notions of justice, not freedom from all re-
straint, but the social freedom which is that which is compatible 
with equal freedom in others. This is jural freedom postulating 
equality and general rules of law applicable to all alike. But in or-
der to develop this complex concept of justice as an original moral 
idea, some power of reasoning in men was necessary. Then he pro-
ceeds: "At first, at his creation, man was put into this free central 
sphere.. Only when he had fallen from it, did necessity as such 
appear, and only then did the exercise of Reason begin,-a high 
gift certainly and indispensable to the fallen nature". This sort 
of stuff is what Puchta places as an introduction to his great treatise 
on Roman law, and he proceeds in this mediaeval style to develop 
a conflict between the principle of Right and that of Morality ! This 
is a favorite thesis of the German school, and they try to put it into 
practice. He has no understanding of the subject at all, but in regard 
to Roman law he states that it developed equality before the law, but 
not freedom. Here is the usual German confusion. He is using 
freedom in two senses without knowing it. J ural freedom is one 
thing; that freedom the Romans had because they had an almost 
perfect system of private law. Political freedom in the sense of 
taking an equal part with others in matters of government, they did 
not ha""'"' 9ut political freedom in that sense had nothing to do with 
the basic idea of justice or law until the idea of equality became 
highly developed as a political tenet. Anyone is at liberty to read 
this worn-out literature, but it has been cast behind by the knowl-
edge of this age. 
We may take now two books of Jhering. One is The Struggle 
for Law, the other, Purpose in Law. The sole idea in The Strug-
gle for Law is that law results from every man contending for his 
rights, that it is this constant clash between human beings that 
develops law, and if men do not insist upon their rights, no law 
will be developed. The necessary result of this would be that if 
men did not violate other men's rights and everybody was law-
abiding, the law would be destroyed. Jhering was not a philosopher. 
In this country his style would have fitted excellently a professional 
oo Puchta, Outlines (Hastie's Trans), p. 5, 6. Mr. Hastie's introduction leads one 
to think that he must be actually descended from that Judge Staunton, whom the ir-
reverent Year Book reporters called Harvie le Hastie. 
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exhorter. A practical lawyer rejects his creeds as nonsense. "Blessed 
are the peacemakers" will do more good than a hundred such 
treatises. When to go to law is a most difficult problem, unless 
you are a fomenter of petty village litigation, or paid by some gov-
ernmental power an unearned salary to stir up litigation. 
His book, The Spirit of Roman Law, outside its erudition, which 
is possible to any one who can write in a note book, has a great 
reputation on account of a number of original views. One of his 
most unpardonable performances was to slander the memory of the 
great Roman lawyer Gaius. No one knows who Gaius was or where 
he lived, so that as to him the Germans are particularly strong, espe-
cially Mommsen. Jhering pondering a problem of Roman law, pro-
ceeded, he tells us, 97 to summon the spirit of Gaius for cross-exam-
ination through the clouds of cigar smoke, and most villainous 
smoke it was, according to my experience, if the cigar was "made 
in Germany". Gaius appeared and Jhering describes him as "a 
strange figure of a man, tall, shrivelled, slightly bow-legged, with 
freckled brow and the general air of a schoolmaster". In fact he 
was a typical German underfed pedagogue. Let us hope that even 
the fat ones now look thin and shrivelled. But what an atrocious 
slander! Gaius was a fine, upstanding Roman, with eagle-face and 
clear-cut features, a high official of the great emperors, Hadrian and 
the Antonines, and for the German savages who were then carry-
ing on barbarous forays on the confines of the Empire, he had a 
limitless horror and contempt. 
As to Jhering's Zweck im Recht (Purpose in Law), Kohler, the 
behemoth of German legal philosophy, tells us that it is full of 
~'amateurish platitudes". The whole idea of it was borrowed from 
the English Utilitarians whose theories Jhering gave a German 
dressing and perpetrated as original matter. The first volume is 
translated and published by the associated law schools. He did 
one good act, he thoroughly punished the aforesaid Puchta in the 
gentle German way that uses a buldgeon, but never a rapier. What 
Jhering professes to have discovered is that the law exists not for 
single men, but for social ends (and a precious discovery it is, but 
over two thousand years too late), and can be consciously formed 
by legislation toward that end, as Bentham contended in his Princi-
ples of Morals and Legislation. Since the English Parliament from 
1275, the beginning of Edward I's great reforming statutes, had 
filled many volumes with acts of legislation all openly for the put-
pose of social ends, Jhering's great discovery seems to lack patent-
01 This tale may be found in the life of Gaius in Continental J urlsts. 
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able novelty, even if Plato, Aristotle and Cicero had not anticipated 
him by prior use. But he begins with the usual metaphysical ap· 
paratus, in which he evolves a psychology of the lower animals, 
followed by a psychology of purpose in ma~, which bears not the 
faintest relation to actual fact. He passes through egoism and 
altruism, to the rewards of society, and the coercian of law. In 
the course of his work, he descends to simple German prattle ;98 
he shows that the military class in Germany perpetuates itself by 
the factors, first, of the government furnishing free public institu· 
tions for instruction "as well as facility for study by means of 
stipends, free board, etc. The second factor is the rich wife. She 
constitutes an important factor in the present system of the gov·, 
ernment service, a scarcely less important requirement than the 
passing· of the examinations. Care is taken that the procuring of 
it shall not be too difficult. The daughter of the rich manufacturer 
or merchant becomes the wife of the military officer or state official; 
she brings him the money, he brings her social position, both are 
benefited". This is what is called the application of Geist to the 
lntelligenzstaat, and to a grave professor at GOttingen it is phil· 
osophy of law. Somewhere Heine says that the three great enemies 
of Napoleon were Louis XVIII, Lord Castlereagh and Professor 
Saalfeld of the University of Gottingen. They all suffered a hor· 
rible fate. Louis XVIII rotted upon his throne, Castlereagh cut 
his own throat and Professor Saalfeld is still a professor at the 
University of GOttingen. In 1848 the liberal minded professors 
were all driven from GOttingen, hence Jhering. It is a pleasure 
to leave this vulgar old man who deserved to die a professor at 
GOttingen. 
We have often referred to Berolzheimer's Legal Philosophies. In 
the fields of ancient law the Germans are particularly strong. Any 
sort of particular assertion almost can be made and no one can 
contradict it, although the general facts are plain. Berolzheimer fol· 
lows in his early pages the work of Leist, who without the least dif· 
ficulty constructs a Primitive Aryan Jus Civile and a Primitive 
Aryan lits Gentium. It seems hardly necessary to point out that 
the jus civile and jits gentiitm were peculiar products of a special 
social situation at Rome, that nothing of the kind could have existed 
among the primitive Aryans, that an equitable system of law by 
the side of a rigid formulary system is peculiarly the work of a 
legal profession. Such difficulties are nothing to Leist; he evolves 
es Law As A Means To An End, p. 151 (a poor title for the translation of Der Zweck 
im Rech:). 
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for the primitive Aryans a jus civile and a jus gtntium, and thereby 
sheds the light of German moonshine over Berolzheimer's p~ges. 
In speaking of Roman law, Berolzheimer following Leist in his 
Graeco-italische Rechtsgeschichte says that the jies gentimn, which 
caused the renaissance of Roman law, was accomplished through 
the philosophical principle of "Ratio (reason). It meant what the 
Egyptians figured as 'Ra', natural energy deified, or the ancient 
Aryans as 'Rita' the regulative principle of the world and nature".99 
On the strength of this problematical common root this whole theory 
is founded, a purely German process without any validity. By this 
method of reasoning it is possible absolutely to prove that that wholly 
unoffending person, Mr. Felix Frankfurter, is the lineal descendant 
of a happy (f eli%) sausage. But Berolzheimer goes further ;1Q0 he 
says that the Greek sophrosmze comprised "all the virtues, modera-
tion in all things-the aeqtta mens of Horace, including, as the prime 
virtue, justice." This is where the German shows his cloven hoof. 
He assumes that any sort of statement will pass. 
Horace's aequa mens occurs in the passage:· 
Aequam memento rebus in arduis 
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis 
Ab insolenti temperatam 
Laetitia, moriture Delli.101 
It means in Knapdale's translation,1°2 which I give for its neatness 
and which has none of Horace's curiosa felicitas: 
"Keep a stout heart when times are bad, my boy, 
And don't forget, when things are looking better, 
To guard against extravagance in joy, 
For death will come-a foe no man can fetter." 
It is the old Epicurean thought and has no more to do with the 
Platonic sophrosune than with German Kultur. Why Fritz should 
assert this to an unsuspecting world passeth all human compre-
hension.103 
.. Berolzheimer, p. 83. 
100 Legal Philosophies, p. 61. 
101 Horace Odes ii, 3, 1. 
101 Blackwood's Mag. cxv, 300. 
103 It was reserved for Bluntschli (Theory of the State, 15-23), to insult the whole 
feminist movement. He asserts in all soberness that the state is philosophically and his-
torically a number of men with a fixed territory, it has unity, an organic nature with 
spirit\ ,and body, with various members, it develops and grows but not naturally; it 
has a moral and spiritual organism and is a personality of the masculine gender/ Shade 
of Susan B. Anthony, arise and lead us! 
Give us an hour of Carrie Catt, 
One lift of Anna's lance, 
to convince this Teuto-Switzer that the state is not a male person. 
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We come now to the leviathan Kohler and his Lehrbuch der 
Rechtsphilosophie. I have already quoted the paeans of the 
duumvirate of our legal philosophy, and we are prepared for a 
work of transcendent merit.104 But first let me state with consid-
erable awe that Professor Kocourek in his introduction to the 
translation asserts that Kohler, this professor of law, "has all the 
versatility and inspiration of Goethe, without any of his frailties". 
These be mighty and Tamberlanian words, my Masters, and it be-
hooves us to ponder them deeply. Goethe is, indeed, one of the 
great lights of the world. If we look over the history of the race 
we cannot find to rank with him as men of letters more than Plato, 
Cicero, Voltaire and Shakespeare. 
"When Goethe's death was told, we said, 
Sunk, then, is Europe's sagest head. 
He took the suffering human race, 
He read each wound, each weakness clear; 
And struck his finger on the place, 
And said, Thou ailest here and here." 
One of the saddest moral debacles in history is shown by the fact 
that at any time within the last thirty years his voice must have 
been silent in Germany. He was a true cosmopolite, who would 
have valued at their actual worth Germany's designs to conquer 
the world, her greed toward her neighbors. He would have re-
buked the feverish activities by which she sought and in many ways 
succeeded in extending her commerce by methods as ruthless as 
those she has exhibited in this, on Germany's part, the most brutal 
war in history. Goethe could not have foreborne his Olympian 
reproof to the rapine, cruelties and frightful barbarities toward non-
combatants, men, women and children, the indiscriminate stealing 
of private and public property, the indescribable savageries toward 
prisoners, the warfare of poisonous gases and of poisoning wells, 
and the dissemination of poison cultures to supplement the no less 
poisonous Kidtur. To Goethe with his wide outlook how dishonor-
ing would have seemed the repulsiveness of the Germany of today 
and its cult of covetousness, its succession of generations trained to 
forget Goethe's, "Thou shalt go without, go without; this is the 
eternal song that every hour hoarsely sings to us our whole life 
'°' In the two volumes of material on comparative law published by the Associated 
Law Schools, compiled by Dean Wigmore and Professor Kocourek, will be found the 
portions of the book that touch comparative law. This collection is quite interesting, 
but many of the conclusions are not proven or capable of proof as our knowledge now 
stands. 
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long''.105 After her prolonged debauch of Pritssianisnms Germany 
will be compelled to return to the wisdom of Goethe, but that time 
seems so far away that Professor Kocourek will have ample oppor-
tunity to learn that one line of Goethe is worth a Congressional Li-
brary of Kohler. 
Kohler has written a book of patent law that has been translated 
and is highly spoken of, as are also his writings on the German 
Civil Code, but the only book by him that is of importance for 
us is his Philosophy of Law. Its favorite word is the constantly 
recurring "culture", used with many diverse meanings. When ap-
plied to Germany it is merely our old conceited friend "Geist" draped 
in a supposedly Hegelian toga. Applied to other countries it con-
notes some particular kind of civilization that the country has pro-
duced. But in his book Kohler nowhere defines the term for the 
obvious reason that in the German way, for purposes of vagueness 
and to cover looseness of thinking, he desires to vary the meaning 
without warning. Simple and credulous persons are likely to be 
deceived. Professor Kocourek quoting from Kohler thinks that 
Kohler's only definition of K1tltur "in the sense of philosophy of 
law is the greatest possible development of human knowledge and 
of human control over nature".106 This is merely another word for 
civilization and surely there is nothing more trite than that history 
shows a developing civilization. But the element in culture of hu-
man knowledge includes the other element of control over nature, 
unless Kohler means to say that actual culture which is an individual 
mental condition is on no higher plane than the mere machinery of 
life. The real difficulty, however, is to decide whether culture is 
an individual self realization of one's highest attributes, or a mere 
governmental training of the population. In some places Kohler 
seems to use the word in the sense which he copied from Matthew 
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy as the greatest individual perfection 
of man. In other places, he uses it merely as synonymous with 
evolution. He says elsewhere that every culture has at a particular 
period its- postulates of law, and he is using the word to denote 
merely a stage of development with its appropriate laws. In an· 
other connection he speaks of the demands of culture upon law as 
the required adaptation of law to social conditions. This hopeless 
mixture is essentially Teutonic. It is due to the fact that every 
1 os Entbchren sol/st d11! sol/st entbefiren! 
Das ist der ewige Gcsang, 
Den unser gan::en Leben lang 
Uns l1eiscr jede Stunde singt. 
100 Kohler, Phil. of Law, 329, note 4. 
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German professor makes his reputation by emitting some new 
theory. Having enunciated a theory they invent facts or bend and 
twist them to suit the theory without any apparent consciousness of 
mental dishonesty. 
German lawyers have not our training in the rules of evidence nor 
our respect for facts. Their law professors are shut up by them-
selves, cut off from contact with practical life and affairs and seem 
to lose all balance of judgment. Here is Kohler, who in his first 
pages enters upon a savage attack upon natural law, found soon as-
saulting Jhering because the latter in his Purpose in Law hoped 
to assist social conditions by legislation, which is just what Kohler 
had been asserting as the demand of culture. In the next breath he 
is abus!ng Windscheid because the latter rejected natural law and 
asserted that the sense of justice is not a source of law, whereas 
Kohler had been practically asserting the same thing. This is a 
peculiarity of German professorial life. The savage attacks upon 
each other can be found nowhere else in Europe, since Milton had 
his famous controversy with Salmasius. In Biblical criticism they 
are just as savage. "Hear Dr. Volkmar on Tischendorf: 'of every 
sovereign in the world he has begged decorations; in vain ; people 
would not treat him seriously. Renan in his life of Jesus never 
once names the Messiah Tischendorf'. Hear Tischendorf on Dr. 
Volkmar: 'The liedom which tramples under foot Church and sci-
ence indifferently! stuck full of lying and cheating'. Professor 
Steinthal says of a rival: "That horrible humbug, that scolding flirt, 
that tricky attorney! whenever I read him, hollow vanity yawns 
in my face, arrogant vanity yawns at me'." 
So it is in the philosophy of the law. Professor Beinkopf1°7 
finds something that strikes him as an idea in English or French or 
Italian writing. He at once invents a new theory, sounds a new 
watchword and savagely criticizes his rivals as without discern-
ment. Thereupon Doctor Schlechtbier retorts with a rolling thunder 
of German amenities pronouncing Beinkopf a hollow sham. This 
rouses Professor Raucher who writes a grund-something-or-other to 
prove to a demonstration that both Beinkopf and Schlechtbier are 
mere dabblers in science, arrogant peacocks, and a disgrace to a 
learned country. The noise of conflict arouses the Geheimrat 
Rauhbart, and by a mere multiplying of language, beginning with 
the heavy patter of metaphysics degenerating into a slow, steady, 
endless drizzle of words, he drowns the others and demonstrates that 
101 I am not sure that I have the name correctly, but it means just what he writes, 
whatever it may be. 
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Beinkopf, Schechtbier and Raucher are all of tnem totally wrong. 
But after the storm has passed it is found that they were all as-
serting the same thoughts in different words, and the only residual 
matter is their denunciations of one another. Professor Kocourek 
apologizes for this "elemental savagery" of German "criticism" by 
the fact that "the German language is blunt and plain".108 It seems 
to be an extraordinary sort of language in which a man cannot ex-
press himself without being a blackguard. As a matter of fact the 
German language is like their critical thought and writing. What 
is needed is justness of perception in dealing with involved facts. 
But in this sort of perception the German mind, as a great critic 
has remarked, is naturally wanting. Their mind is like their lan-
guage, not clear but vague and gauche; it has in it "something splay 
and something blunt-edged, unhandy, infelicitous-some positive 
want of straightforward, sure perception". The language permits 
and encourages the invention of awkward, vague compounds, with 
no restraint upon their ugliness. This gives their language to or-
dinary eyes its tremendously learned appearance. The average man 
is bound to assume when he sees such agglutinative monstrosities as 
Milita.rstrafgerichtsverfahren, Gerichtsverfassungsgestez, Poliszu-
sammengeh6rigkeit, Geschlechtsgenossenschaft, Biiffelshalsbuckels-
fettigheit, 109 Entwickelungsgeschichte, or V6lkerrechtswissenschafts-
lehre sprawling their uncouth lengths of tremendous consonantal 
thickets across the page, that the language is learned and the 
thought profound. But this is all illusion. Aristophanes or Plautus 
did this kind of thing for fun, but the Germans are in deadly, sober 
earnest. 
Kohler as a preliminary matter lays down the metaphysical basis 
or lack of basis of his legal philosophy, and at once we find our-
selves in the Dismal Swamp of "reality", "ego", "non-ego", "duality" 
and "identity". He rejects K'ant's dualism and Kant's demonstra-
tion after Hume that thinking subject, mind, cannot be identified 
with the object thought of. This to Kohler is a great error but if 
it had ever happened to Kohler to be hit in the head by a brick he 
would find some difficulty in identifying the brick with his own 
sensations. Nay, rather, Kohler says with owl-like gravity, "we 
must assert that ego and non-ego belong to one great world whole". 
Certainly we must, and it never occurred to Kant to claim that the 
1os Kohler, Phil. of Law, p. xxi. 
100 This word is the title of an obscure treatise on the fatty hump that some of the 
gentler sex develop between the shoulders at the base of the neck as the years pass. 
This German has invented in his gallant German way a word which translated means 
Buffalo·neck-hump·fattishness and written a treatise on it. 
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external world was out of the world. Kohler next enunciates his 
· refutation of Kant's dualism: "If the ego apprehends the non-ego, 
that is the external world about it, as an object, then the external 
world becomes unified by perception with ou.r own ego and thereby 
forms an entity independent but homogeneous to our own ego". 
But Kohler simply thinks that he is thinking. To unite two things 
so that they form independent entities is not identity but it is dual-
ism and the infinite vagueness of his word "homogeneous" is ap-
parent. The external world was a separate entity before it was 
unified just as afterward. Kohler has now gotten out of his depth, 
so he begins to quote Hegel : "I distinguish myself from myself 
and therein I am immediately aware that this factor distinguished 
from ll}e is not distinguished". By this he means: I can observe 
the operations of my own mind, therefore I know that I am myself. 
But this is the old Cartesian: "I think, therefore I exist", (je pense 
done je suis). Then follows this gem: "I, the self same being, 
thrust myself away from myself, but this which is distinguished, 
which is set up as unlike me, is immediately upon its being dis-
tinguished no distinction for me." But what an absurdity it is. 
Because I can observe my own mind, or to put it as we usually do, 
because I am self-conscious, I know that what I am knowing is 
my own mind, myself, and because I can observe my mind, it is a 
part of the external world, but I identify my observed mind with 
itself doing the observing, wherefore the external world is identified 
with my own mind and is my mind.11° Kohler then on this basis 
invents the most absurd of all the theories, a theory which shows 
that he does not understand Hegel and is more dualistic even than 
Kant. He says we have two minds, the mind that observes itself 
and the other mind that is observed, a real ego and a phenomenon 
ego. And now a man who is no metaphysician at all knows that 
Kohler has talked himself into a German mess. But we must leave 
Kohler in this Slough of metaphysical Despond.111 We merely re-
mark that he does not connect his metaphysics with his philosophy 
of law. 
He now proceeds to reprimand. Ahrens, Krause and Roder "for 
their utter banality and poverty of ideas", and Merkel who "caused 
the decay of juristic thought" and Jhering who "with superficial 
uo Leibnitz's apothegm is: "Nihil in intel/ectu nisi fotellectus ipse.'' 
111 There is a book, "Immanuel Kant," in two large windy volumes, by that pitiable 
renegade Houston Stewart Chamberlain. I cannot advise any one who values his time 
to read it, but in it the renegade has shown the Germans that in fuliginous vagueness 
he has surpassed them all. In a sane moment he describes the Hegelian identity of! 
subject and object as the "primeval Aryan Myth of all the Myths". See vol. i, 318, 319. 
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brilliancy" made "a few stammering remarks", which is too de-
lightful applied to a man who had all the volubility of a com 
sheller. He next denounces Stammler for saying that "at no stage 
of human culture has slavery been just", which certainly is true. 
Even Cicero asserted it, and Seneca made a homily upon it, that 
ought to convince even Kohler. Lastly Kohler mentions his col-
league Lassan in a handsome way, and Lassan replies with a lauda-
tory review at which the amiable Professor Kocourek is so aston-
ished that he prints it as Appendix II to the book before another 
review by a highly mystified Italian. 
We need not delay over Kohler's commonplace views on causa-
tion and psychic life, by which he means mental factors of race 
and individual psychology, or his excursion into collectivity and in-
dividualization without betraying any knowledge of evolutionary 
psychology, or his remarks on the culture of wealth, where he makes 
the total error of saying that the desire to accumulate property is 
not innate, or his wholly inadequate explanation of possession or his 
"technic of the law" which requires objects of right, by which he 
means rights in material and immaterial things and rights in one's 
own personality and in others' persons (the right in another does 
not extend to destroying that other's personality) which rights are 
either general or limited. Here he makes a classification that is 
rendered possible only by the confusion in German legal concep-
tions. The counterpart of a right is a claim to call upon another 
to perform some act. But he does not seem to know the difficulty 
involved here, and his statement is so confused that it is apparent 
that he has taken refuge in Hegelianism. He denies with heat that 
individuals have a1iy cfaini upon the state for justice or that he is 
"an exponent of the absolute State". 
The whole subject of existing law he divides into the law of 
individual persons, the law of the body politic and the law of 
human society. The law of individual persons is divided into the 
subdivisions of persons and of property. It is needless to say that 
there is nothing new in his classification and the difficulties of the 
classification are enormous. But it is all a mere sketchy outline with 
some comparative law material that is not proven to say the least 
of it. He enters upon a warm defence of the cultural value of 
slavery, without betraying the slightest knowledge that slavery is 
caused by an inadequate division of labor and is in that respect a 
real obstacle to progress, while it feeds the cruel instincts of cruel 
men. Yet in the next breath he avers that the substitution of a 
peasant class and an artisan class ennobled work. What he does 
not see is that the theory of the ancient world was. the production 
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of a very highly developed but small class resting upon a very large 
but degraded class, and that this conception violates the fundamental 
notion of justice and therefore of law which he says must be · 
founded on justice. · Kohler has never di~covered what are the 
moral emotions and their concepts and how they developed, and in 
this regard he is like most German legal philosophers. 
We need not delay upon his law of property and obligations. It 
is all obvious enough but better stated by any of the English 
analytical jurists, and much more clearly even by Gareis.112 His 
division of public law begins with the statement that the State is a 
community organized into a personality, which, by virtue of its own 
law, takes upon itself the task of promoting culture and opposing 
non-cul!ure; and "it aims at performing this task not only in certain 
respects, but in all the directions of human endeavor and develop-
ment." If this is so it must administer justice to its citizens and to 
others against its citizens and between itself and individuals, but 
this now conceded fact he had just before denied and had strenu-
ously argued that it was neither proper nor necessary. He seems to 
deny here the Prussian theory of the state and he does not meet 
the question as to what is the state, whether the government or the 
social aggregate, and he does not attempt to solve whether the state 
is bound by its own laws. In his comparative law regarding the 
evolution of the State he enters upon a warm eulogy of the King-
ship and thoroughly endorses the necessity for the division of power 
into legislative, executive and judicial. Kohler shows that he has 
read much English history and literature, and therefore he is a 
warm exponent of representative government. I pass over his 
pages on the law of procedure merely remarking that the practical 
difficulties do not seem to have occurred to him. He repudiates the 
criminologists in the strongest and most cutting terms, and offers 
some remarks of his own upon punishment which contain nothing 
that is valuable or new. 
We now reach the crucial point with Kohler, his law of humanity. 
This term has a strange sound coming from a German, but before 
the war Kohler was the German exponent of public international 
law. He insists that in the ancient world public international law 
was known and stood above the nations.113 The one universal Em-
pire destroyed the necessity for such law, but when the imperial 
= Gareis, Science of Law (translated by Kocourek). 
ua Philipson's International Law among the Greeks and Romans is an excellent work. 
Kohler no doubt had read it, but like most Germans he is chary of giving foreign credit. 
They rely upon foreign writings for the views which they announce as new to the be-
fuddled Germans. 
GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 371 
sway was ended international law had to begin anew. "Hence the 
idea was bound to arise that * * * a super-national law ruled, that 
regulated the relations of the nations to one another; they, neither 
(sic) could live in anarchy but (sic) must conduct themselves to-
wards one another according to definite legal principles." Here he 
admits the basis of and the necessity for, and the existence of in-
ternational, or as he calls it, super-national law. He illustrates the 
point by the law of federated states and he asserts that the two 
are strictly analogous. "After the separation of states, interna-
tional law, as the super-national standard, necessarily combined the 
nations and created legal relations among them." "When once the 
idea has arisen in this way that there is some law above the State, 
a so-called super-national law, we have gained a new plane of cul-
ture". He advocates the proposition that super-national law grants 
rights to individuals which are independent of the legislation of in-
dividual states. He then formulates certain rules of war, that war 
is subject to international law, that war must be humane, that only 
those sufferings may be inflicted which serve its purposes, that there 
must be no war against the population, but only against the State and 
its combatants. Only such war is legal, he asserts, and outside of 
this range, combatants inflicting wrong are not protected by the 
fact of war. Prisoners of war may not be harmed, inhabitants may 
not be enslaved or robbed and plundered. 
This is the result of Kohler's book. His principles pronounce 
the submarine warfare on merchant vessels, the pillaging of Bel-
gium, northern France and Serbia, the robbery and plundering of 
the inhabitants, the cruelties toward the prisoners in German hands, 
to be absolutely unlawful, and the men who have ordered it are, 
according to him, personally responsible under international law. He 
condemns, also, the poison gases used by the Germans, the bombard-
ing of unprotected and unfortified cities with or without notice. 
The shelling of merchant vessels with or without warning, the 
dastardly acts by which boats putting off are shelled and sunk, are 
acts of piracy according to Kohler. If what he wrote before the 
war is true, the Kaiser and his general and naval staff, and most 
of his commanders in the field, may be punished as criminals under 
the rules of international law since they have departed from the 
laws of war and cannot plead its protection. According to Kohler's 
ideas international law justifies the hanging of the Kaiser when he 
is apprehended. It is proven by this book written before the war 
by the highest authority in Germany that the contentions of the 
Allies are strictly true. 
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Now I have to record the strangest Teutonic phenomenon in the 
philosophy of law. Here was a man committed to the rules of in-
ternational law and to their binding effect. He had been braying 
about culture for many years. He had edited the Zeitschrift fiir 
Volkerrecht (Journal of International Law). He had asserted by 
anticipation that the whole method of German warfare was illegal 
and barbarous. But when the war had started he showed his own 
lack of mental honesty in an article in his Journal which is a genuine 
curiosity.114 He there first speaks of the efforts of The Hague 
Peace Conferences and says that those dreams have bur!?t like bub-
bles. He means that the Germans having solemnly engaged to ob-
serve the rules, treated them like bubbles even unto bursting. 
"We. also were enthralled by these illusions and we are frank 
enough to confess, if we are rebuked for being impractical and 
shortsighted for doing so, that it was our honorable German nature 
which permitted us to overlook cunning and wickedness ; it was 
our belief in mankind which led us and the thought that at least a 
spark of our German idealism was to be found among other peo-
ples". One would imagine that he means to say that his "honor-
able" German nature was deceived by the Kaiser, but no, we find 
that this greatest living jurist is not an actual man, merely a thing 
painted to look like a man. He deliberately says that what he means 
is that he did not know what the German general staff was going 
to do, and hence he was grossly deceived in the honesty of the 
Allies, because they objected and left him bound by the rules that 
he had been asserting as rules of international law. By his method 
of reasoning Belgium was guilty of a gross breach of faith to him 
personally when it objected to being pillaged. 
But Kohler goes on with an elaborately tiresome figure from the 
Wagnerian music of the speech of the birds in the forest, and here 
he makes a grotesque error in metaphor. The speech of the birds 
that Siegfried heard was the speech of innocent, well meaning 
birds, yet Kohler has his hulking Siegfried hearing in the speech 
of the innocent birds lies and slander, and suddenly in this mixed 
metaphor the birds have become a dragon of cunning, lies and 
slander which is "stretched beneath our victorious sword". Now 
comes the German blackguardism so prominent a characteristic of 
their legal philosophers. He seems to think that the Allies had 
no right to insist on the treaties because they are "liars and falsi-
fiers" ; the French are "a nation of bragging tricksters", the English 
n• See the article in Michigan Law Rev. xv, 634, translated by Professor Reeves, now 
of the Flying Corps. 
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are "a race of sneaking bandits" who resorted to bribery to ap-
prehend that patriot Roger Casement, the Russians are "a nation 
of barbarians" (perhaps now he would find good in Lenine and his 
tribe), the Italians are "an immature and half educated proletariat", 
the United States is "ruled by the Morgan-Vanderbilt" millions, 
and all are cast into outer darkness. Could anything be more utterly 
fantastic, and is not Kohler a pronouncedly stuffed prophet? 
But he goes on to console himself with the thought that in the 
future Germany will have no international law with any nations ex-
cept those within "our circle of culture", Austria, "the highly gifted 
Hungarians" and "an important group of Slavs", "in alliance with 
Turkey as a powerful fortress of Islamic culture". Fortunately we 
have some very apposite remarks on Turkey as the depositary of 
culture by Germany's most popular historian. Treitschke says of 
Turkey: "It is to be hoped that the future will wipe out the scandal 
of having such a government on European soil. * * * The Turks 
have never developed at all, and in virture of their lazy-mindedness 
have always remained a nation of soldiers. * * * A state capable 
of such proceedings will never change, but since some of the old 
martial spirit survives * * * Turkey will in all probability remain 
in Europe until driven out by force. * * * 'The famous dogs of 
Constantinople are the best simile that can be found of a people 
mentally inert. ':' * * It was therefore quite reasonable and logical 
to exclude the Porte, for many hundreds of years, from the scope 
of European international law. The government of the Sultan had 
no claim to a full share in its benefits so long as the Porte was 
dominated by a Mohammedan civilization".115 Treitschke little sup-
posed that the day would come when Germany would stand before 
the world as a criminal condemned to be excluded from the equality 
of international law until she had rid herself of a government of 
freebooters worse than the Sultan. Kohler concludes his article: 
"Naturally International Law needs its sanction just as every 
branch of law does, but we shall, as I hope, be so vastly fortified 
by our victorious war that we can undertake the protection of In-
ternational Law". But he has already said that international law 
is to be confined to Germany and her subject nations, Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. 
Thus we see that for Germany international law means the kind 
of law that enables Germany to do what she pleases, to violate 
treaties, to perpetrate all manner of barbarities, and this international 
law she is prepared to protect. It is the solid, aes triplex plate of 
m See Treitschke's Politics, vot ii, passim. 
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conceit and arrogance that prevents these Germans from appraising 
themselves correctly. For many years it has been so beaten into 
them that they are the greatest race, entitled by divine right to 
rule the world, that they think they are actil}g too modestly if they 
are not continually insisting upon it. The greatest critic of life 
that England has yet produced has said in his inimitable way: "Dr. 
Mommsen, when he became Rector of the University of Berlin, with 
a charming crudity, gravely congratulated his countrymen on not 
being modest, and adjured them never to fall into that sad fault. 
These are the intemperances and extravagances which men versed 
in practical life feel to be absurd. One is not disposed to form 
great expectations of the balance of judgment in those who com-
mit the_m". In matters requiring as much tact in weighing facts 
and judgment in sifting theories as is required in the philosophy 
of law, we may be sure that the Germans are conspicuously want-
ing, and therefore of no use to us. We have seen that Kohler in 
his book is wanting in judgment and coherence, and in his conduct 
has displayed a childishness that is hopeless. All we can say of a 
man who thinks him the greatest jurist in the world is, 
B oetum ·in crasso jurares aere natuni. 
But here let me record that there is in Germany a basis to build 
upon anew. Dr. Wehberg, of Diisseldorf, took issue with Kohler, 
sharply reproved him and discontinued his association with the 
Zeitschrift. But among the great mass of them Kohler will remain 
a prophet and a great jurist even as he is to Dean Pound and Pro-
fessor Kocourek. But it needs only a critical examination to show 
that the abnormal self-conceit, the lack of humor of self-conceit, 
the blindness and incapacity for self-examination that come from 
self-conceit, make German philosophy of law utterly worthless. The 
late Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School, a finished scholar who 
worked with distinction on the lines that offer so much to the legal 
scholar, a man whose death was an irreparable loss, told a student 
of his who was departing for Germany to avoid their philosophy of 
law. He had found it to be mere pedantry and chaff-cutting. The 
situation is really worse. The difference between a civilized man 
and a barbarian or savage is that the latter cannot appreciate an-
other's point of view. In this respect the German is a barbarian, for 
he will not even examine another's point of view, hence his greed 
for what he calls "his place in the sun", which means the taking of 
another's place. 
The very history of our race and the necessities of social exist-
ence teach us that among nations the same justice shall apply as 
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among individuals. The primary notions of fn:eaom and equality 
are precisely as binding. All must be equal before that Interna-
tional Law which is the ligament of justice that holds the nations to-
gether. The humble state has a claim on international law as great 
and as sacred as that of any other state. In one view its rights 
are even greater, for it is base and unmanly to trample on the 
weak. The invasion of a strong country may require courage, but 
to tread upon the weak adds contemptible and cowardly meanness 
to a cruel wrong. The world cannot admit the pretension of a lot 
of criminals under international law to repeal the law of justice 
and equality that is made for all nations. The civilized world has 
been taken at a disadvantage by the strong marauder who had pre-
pared his forces, but the posse nationuni has been organized, is being 
constantly augmented. 
If the safety of a single state from robbery and oppression is 
worth fighting for, how much more vital is it to preserve the moral 
government of all civilized society. To this end the criminals must 
be apprehended that the law may be restored for the law-abiding. 
"They pour their youth and treasure 
For the fullness of the measure 
Of the light that shall endure, of the law that shall be sure, 
Of the equity of freedom-that all nations may possess".116 
:no Lines from "America to England, 1917,'' by Charles Mills Gayley. 
